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Abstract Rule-based argumentation systems are developed for reasoning about defeasible1
information. As a major feature, their logical language distinguishes between strict rules2
(encoding strict information) and defeasible rules (describing general behavior with excep-3
tional cases). They build arguments by chaining such rules, deﬁne attacks between them, 14
use a semantics for evaluating the arguments and ﬁnally identify the plausible conclusions5
that follow from the rules. Focusing on the family of inconsistency-based attack relations,6
this paper presents the ﬁrst study of the outcomes of such systems under various acceptabil-7
ity semantics, namely naive, stable, semi-stable, preferred, grounded and ideal. It starts by8
extending the existing list of rationality postulates that any rule-based system should satisfy. 29
Then, it deﬁnes the key notion of option of a theory (a theory being a set of facts, a set of10
strict rules and a set of defeasible rules). For each of the cited semantics, it characterizes the11
extensions of a rule-based system that satisﬁes all the postulates in terms of options of the12
theory under which the system is built. It also fully characterizes the set of plausible con-13
clusions of the system. The results show that designing a rule-based argumentation system14
requires great care.15
Keywords Defeasible reasoning · Rule-based systems · Argumentation16
1 Introduction17
Argumentation is a promising approach for reasoning about inconsistent information. It con-18
sists of generating arguments that support claims, deﬁning attacks between them, evaluating19
B Leila Amgoud
amgoud@irit.fr
Philippe Besnard
besnard@irit.fr
1 CNRS – IRIT, 118, route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse, France
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the arguments using a given semantics and ﬁnally identifying the plausible claims on the20
basis of the strength of their arguments.21
Dungproposed in [1] various semantics at an abstract level, i.e.,without taking into account22
the structure of arguments or the nature of attacks. His abstract framework was instantiated23
by several scholars. The idea is as follows: Start with a knowledge base whose elements are24
encoded in a logical language, generate arguments using the consequence operator attached25
to the language, identify the attacks and applyDung’s semantics for the evaluation task. There26
were two major categories of instantiations for this abstract framework. The ﬁrst category27
uses deductive logics (such as propositional logic [2,3] or any Tarskian logic [4]), whereas28
the second category uses rule-based languages. These languages distinguish between:29
• facts which are information about particular instances like “My laptop is heavy.”30
• strict rules which encode general laws about classes of instances like “First generation31
laptops are heavy.” Such rules do not have exceptions.32
• defeasible ruleswhich describe general behavior with exceptional cases. Defeasible rules33
correspond thus to what is called defaults in [5] or conditional assertions in [6,7].34
Examples of rule-based argumentation systems are: aspic [8], its extended version aspic+35
[9],DeLP [10] and the systems developed in [11–15]. Despite the popularity of these systems,36
the results they return have not been characterized yet, except the system discussed in [11].37
The following questions are thus still open:38
• what are the underpinnings of the extensions under various semantics?39
• do the semantics return different results as at the abstract level?40
• what is the number of extensions a system may have?41
• what are the plausible conclusions with such systems?42
In this paper, we answer all the four questions in three steps:We start by deﬁning a rule-based43
argumentation system over a knowledge base called theory (a set of facts, a set of strict rules44
and a set of defeasible rules). The system uses a notion of derivation schema for generating45
arguments from the theory. For the sake of generality, the attack relation is left unspecified.46
However, it has the property of being conflict-dependent, that is, it captures the inconsistency47
that may be present in the theory. It is worth mentioning that all existing attack relations (like48
rebuttal and assumption attack) are conﬂict-dependent. A notable exception is undercutting49
which aims at blocking the application of defeasible rules [16].50
In a second step, we extend the list of postulates (consistency, closure under strict rules)51
proposed in [17]. The aim of those postulates is to mathematically capture what humans52
perceive as rationale behavior from the semantics of defeasible theories. They are thus desir-53
able properties that a system should satisfy. We introduce three new postulates. The ﬁrst54
one, strict precedence, ensures that any claim that follows from the strict part of a theory is55
a plausible conclusion of the argumentation system. The second postulate, exhaustiveness,56
ensures a form of completeness of the extensions of an argumentation system. The third57
postulate, closure under sub-arguments, states that an argument cannot be accepted if one of58
its sub-parts is questionable.59
Finally, we investigate the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy all60
the postulates. We show that naive extensions return options of the theory (an option being a61
sub-theory that gathers a maximal-up to consistency-set of the facts, strict rules, and defeasi-62
ble rules). Furthermore, the set of plausible conclusions under the naive semantics contains63
all the conclusions that are drawn from all the options. Stable extensions return preferred64
options but not necessarily all of them; it depends on the attack relation at work. Unlike65
options, preferred options are options that contain the strict part. Should not all preferred66
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A formal characterization of the outcomes of rule-based…
options be picked as stable extensions, deﬁning an attack relation that discards exactly the67
spurious ones thus turns out to be tricky. The same results hold under preferred semantics.68
We also characterize both ideal and grounded extensions.We show that the ideal extension of69
an argumentation system is the set of arguments built from the free part of a theory (i.e., the70
sub-theory that contains the strict part as well as all defeasible rules that are not involved in71
any minimal conﬂict). The grounded extension is a subset of the ideal extension. This means72
that under grounded semantics, an argumentation system may miss intuitive conclusions.73
74 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 recallsDung’s semantics. Section 3 introduces5
the logical language that will be used in the paper. Section 4 deﬁnes rule-based argumen-76
tation systems. Section 5 introduces a list of postulates that such systems should satisfy.77
Section 6 studies the outcomes of rule-based systems under naive, stable, semi-stable, pre-78
ferred, grounded and ideal semantics. Section 7 discusses how our results may apply to79
existing systems, and the last section concludes.80
2 Abstract argumentation framework81
An argumentation framework consists of a set of arguments and a binary relation express-82
ing attacks among the arguments. Throughout this section, the structure and the origin of83
arguments are left unspeciﬁed.84
Deﬁnition 1 (Argumentation framework) An argumentation framework is a pair H =85
(A,R) where A is a non-empty (possibly inﬁnite) set of arguments and R ⊆ A × A is86
an attack relation. A pair (a, b) ∈ Rmeans that a attacks b. A set E ⊆ A attacks an argument87
b iff ∃a ∈ E such that (a, b) ∈ R.88
Notation We sometimes use the inﬁx notation aRb to denote (a, b) ∈ R.89
An argumentation framework (A,R) is represented as a graph, argumentation graph,90
whose nodes are the arguments of A and its edges are the attacks in R. Arguments are91
evaluated using a semantics, i.e., a set of criteria that should be satisﬁed by an argument92
in order to be acceptable. Throughout this paper, we focus on extension-based semantics93
initially introduced by Dung [1]. Such semantics look for acceptable sets of arguments,94
called extensions. Each extension represents a coherent point of view and satisﬁes two basic95
properties: conflict-freeness and defense.96
Deﬁnition 2 (Conflict-freeness, defense, admissibility) LetH = (A,R)be an argumentation97
framework and E ⊆ A.98
• E is conflict-free iff ∄a, b ∈ E such that (a, b) ∈ R.99
• E defends an argument a iff ∀b ∈ A, if (b, a) ∈ R, then E attacks b.100
• E is an admissible set iff E is conﬂict-free and defends all its elements.101
The following deﬁnition recalls the main semantics that were proposed in [1,18,19]. It is102
worth noticing that all those semantics are based on the notion of admissibility.103
Deﬁnition 3 (Semantics) Let H = (A,R) be an argumentation framework, and E ⊆ A be104
a conﬂict-free set.105
• E is a naive extension iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) conﬂict-free set.106
• E is a complete extension iff E is an admissible set that contains any argument it defends.107
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• E is a preferred extension iff E is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) complete extension.108
• E is a stable extension iff E attacks any argument in A\E .109
• E is a semi-stable extension iff E is a complete extension and the union of the set E and110
the set of all arguments attacked by E is maximal (w.r.t. ⊆).111
• E is a grounded extension iff E is a minimal (w.r.t. ⊆) complete extension.112
• E is an ideal extension iff E is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) admissible set contained in every113
preferred extension.114
An argumentation framework has a single grounded (respectively ideal) extension. How-115
ever, it may have several naive, admissible, complete, preferred, stable and semi-stable116
extensions. It may also have zero stable extensions.117
Notations LetH = (A,R) be an argumentation framework. We denote by Extx (H) the set118
of all extensions of H under semantics x ∈ {n, p, s, ss}, where n (respectively119
p, s, ss) stands for naive (respectively preferred, stable and semi-stable). We120
denote by GE(H) (respectively IE(H)) the single grounded (respectively ideal)121
extension of H. When we do not need to refer to a particular semantics, we write122
Ext(H) for short.123
The following result recalls some key properties of these semantics.124
Property 1 [1,18,19] Let H = (A,R) be an argumentation framework.125
• Exts(H) ⊆ Extn(H)126
• Exts(H) ⊆ Extp(H)127
• If |Exts(H)| > 0, then Exts(H) = Extss(H)128
• H has one grounded (respectively ideal) extension129
• GE(H) ⊆ IE(H)130
When Exts(H) = Extp(H), the framework H is said to be coherent. It is also worth131
recalling that an argumentation framework that has an inﬁnite set of arguments may have an132
inﬁnite number of extensions (under multiple-extensions semantics).133
Let us now illustrate the different semantics on the argumentation frameworkH1 depicted134
below.135
e b
c
d a f g
136
This framework has eight naive extensions:137
• E1 = {a, c, g},138
• E2 = {d, e, f },139
• E3 = {b, d, f },140
• E4 = {a, e, g},141
• E5 = {a, b, g},142
• E6 = {b, e, g},143
• E7 = {b, d, g}, and144
• E8 = {c, f }.145
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H1 has one stable/semi-stable extension E3 and two preferred extensions: E3 and E6 = {a, g}.146
Its grounded and ideal extensions are empty (GE(H1) = IE(H1) = ∅).147
Consider now the following argumentation framework H2 borrowed from [19]. It lays148
bare some differences between ideal and grounded semantics.149
a b c d
150
It can be checked that:151
• GE(H2) = ∅,152
• Extp(H2) = {{b, c}, {b, d}}, and153
• IE(H2) = {b}.154
Throughout the paper, we will refer to the seven semantics of Deﬁnition 3 by the reviewed155
semantics, and by extension-based semantics to any semantics, which partitions the power156
set of the set of arguments into two parts: extensions and non-extensions. Note that there157
are other semantics in the literature like recursive [20] and stage [21] that follow this line of158
research. This distinction is important since some of the results in the next sections hold for159
any extension-based semantics, while others hold under the reviewed ones.160
3 Rule-based logical language161
In what follows, L is a set of literals, i.e., atoms or negation of atoms. The negation of an162
atom x fromL is denoted¬x . We consider two additional constants⊤ and σ such that⊤ /∈ L163
and σ /∈ L. Three kinds of information are distinguished:164
• Facts, which are elements of L ∪ {⊤}165
• Strict rules, which are of the form x1, . . . , xn → x (x, x1, . . . , xn denoting literals in L)166
• Defeasible rules, which are of the form x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x or of the form ⊤ ⇒ x167
(x, x1, . . . , xn denoting literals in L)168
Facts are information about particular instances.A strict rule expresses general information169
that has no exception. It is read as follows: If x1, . . . , xn hold, then x always holds. A170
defeasible rule of the form x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x expresses general information that may have171
exceptions and is read as follows: If x1, . . . , xn hold, then generally x holds as well. A172
defeasible rule of the form⊤ ⇒ x expresses that x is a defeasible fact and is read as follows:173
generally x holds. Unlike existing systems like ASPIC [8] where a strict rule with an empty174
body represents a fact, in our formalismwe keep general information and factual information175
separate.176
LetL′ be a set of atoms used for naming rules with the constraintsL∩L′ = ∅,⊤ /∈ L′ and177
σ /∈ L′. Every rule has a unique name and two rules cannot have the same name. Throughout178
the paper, rules are named r, r1, r2, . . .179
Deﬁnition 4 (Theory) A theory is a triple T = (F,S,D)whereF = {⊤}∪ X , with X ⊆ L,180
is a set of facts, and S ⊆ L′ (respectively D ⊆ L′) is a set of strict (respectively defeasible)181
rules’ names. T is finite iff all three sets F , S and D are ﬁnite.182
Note that ⊤ is a fact in any theory. Note also that the two sets S and D contain names of183
rules and not the corresponding rules themselves. Throughout the paper, (F,S,∅) is referred184
to as the strict part of a theory T = (F,S,D).185
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Notations Let r ∈ L′, the functionRule(r) returns the (strict or defeasible) rulewhose name186
is r . For each rule x1, . . . , xn → x (respectively x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x or ⊤ ⇒ x)187
whose name is r , the head of the rule is Head(r) = x and the body of the188
rule is Body(r) = {x1, . . . , xn} or Body(r) = {⊤}. Let T = (F,S,D) and189
T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) be two theories. We say that T is a sub-theory of T ′, written190
T ⊑ T ′, iff F ⊆ F ′ and S ⊆ S ′ and D ⊆ D′. The relation ⊏ is the strict version191
of ⊑ (i.e., it is the case that at least one of the three inclusions is strict).192
The notion of consistency is deﬁned as follows:193
Deﬁnition 5 (Consistency) A set X ⊆ L is consistent iff ∄x, y ∈ X such that x = ¬y. It is194
inconsistent otherwise.195
This simple deﬁnition of consistency is sufﬁcient since the language L contains only196
literals.However, it is not suitable in case of richer languages.Assume thatL is a propositional197
language. Thus, the set {x, y,¬x∨¬y} is consistent with respect to the above deﬁnitionwhile198
it is clearly not the case. Thus, richer languages require a stronger deﬁnition of consistency199
like the one proposed in [22].200
Without loss of generality, throughout the paper we make the three following assumptions201
about rules.202
Assumptions The body of every (strict/defeasible) rule is ﬁnite and not empty. Moreover,203
for each rule r ,Body(r)∪{Head(r)} is consistent.We say that r is consistent.204
Note that the fact that rules are consistent does not ensure the consistency of a set of rules.205
[23] discussed different forms of rule consistency. One of them is illustrated by the example206
{x ⇒ y, y ⇒ ¬x} where both defeasible rules are consistent whereas together lead to an207
inconsistent rule x ⇒ ¬x .208
Let us now show how new information (i.e., literal) is produced from a given theory. This209
is generally the case when (strict and/or defeasible) rules are ﬁred in a derivation schema.210
Belowwe provide a deﬁnitionwhich generalizes derivations as deﬁned by [10,24] and others.211
Deﬁnition 6 (Derivation schema) Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory, x ∈ L. A derivation212
schema for x from T is a ﬁnite sequence d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 such that:213
• xn = x214
• for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},215
• xi ∈ F and ri = σ , or216
• xi = Head(ri ), with ri ∈ S ∪D and Body(ri ) ⊆ {x1, .., xi−1}217
Seq(d) = {x1, . . . , xn}.218
Facts(d) = {xi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri = σ }.219
Strict(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ S}.220
Def(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ D}.221
In order to improve readability, we somehow abuse the notation: we use the rules them-222
selves instead of their names.223
Example 1 Consider the theory T1 such that F1, S1, D1 are as follows.224
F1
{
p
q S1
⎧⎨
⎩
p → s (r1)
q → ¬s (r2)
p, s → u (r3)
D1
⎧⎨
⎩
¬s ⇒ t (r4)
t, u ⇒ v (r5)
p ⇒ q (r6)
225
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Each of (1)–(7) below is a derivation schema from theory T1226
〈(p, σ )〉 (1)227
〈(q, σ ), (¬s, r2)〉 (2)228
〈(p, σ ), (s, r1), (u, r3)〉 (3)229
〈(p, σ ), (s, r1), (p, σ ), (u, r3)〉 (4)230
〈(p, σ ), (q, σ ), (s, r1), (u, r3)〉 (5)231
〈(p, σ ), (q, r6), (¬s, r2)〉 (6)232
〈(p, σ ), (q, σ ), (¬s, r2), (s, r1), (u, r3), (t, r4), (v, r5)〉 (7)233
A derivation schema is not necessarily consistent (such as (7) above), as it may contain234
opposite literals in the form xi = ¬x j for some i and j . (A derivation d is consistent235
iff Seq(d) is consistent.) Moreover, a derivation schema is not necessarily minimal (for set236
inclusion) as shown in Example 1: compare (3) with (4). The former is a proper sub-sequence237
of the latter.238
Deﬁnition 7 (Minimal derivation schema) Let T be a theory and x ∈ L. A derivation schema239
for x from T is minimal iff none of its proper subsequences is a derivation schema for x from240
T .241
Interestingly enough, there are two ways for a derivation schema not to be minimal for242
set inclusion: (i) involving superﬂuous literals, i.e., literals that do not serve toward inferring243
the conclusion as is illustrated by (5) in Example 1 (q is of no use there), (ii) involving244
redundancy (hence, repeated literals) as illustrated by (4) in Example 1 (p is repeated twice).245
Deﬁnition 8 (Focused derivation schema) Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory and x ∈ L. A246
derivation schema d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 for x from T is focused iff it can be reduced247
to a minimal one by just deleting repeated pairs (xi , ri ).248
Property 2 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory and x ∈ L. A derivation schema d =249
〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 for x from T is minimal iff d is focused and the literals x1, . . . , xn250
are pairwise distinct.251
Notations For a theory T , CN(T ) denotes the set of all literals that have a derivation schema252
from T . We call CN(T ) the potential consequences drawn from T (for short,253
consequences) but they need not be deﬁnitive as they may happen to be dismissed254
by opposite conclusions.255
The following property applies to the consequences drawn from a given theory.256
Property 3 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.257
• CN(T ) ⊆ F ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ S ∪D} ⊆ L258
• If T is finite, then CN(T ) is finite259
• F ⊆ CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ CN(T )260
• ⊤ ∈ CN(T )261
• CN(T ) = {⊤} iff F = {⊤} and ∄r ∈ D such that Body(r) = {⊤}.262
• If d is a derivation schema from T , Seq(d) ⊆ CN(T )263
Some rules may not be activated (i.e., the literals in their body have no derivation schema).264
Let us consider the following example.265
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Example 2 Let T2 = (F2,S2,D2) be a theory such that266
F2
{
p
q S2
{
p → t (r1)
s → u (r2)
D2
{
p ⇒ q (r3)
u ⇒ v (r4)
267
There are rules herewhose head is not a consequence of T2. In symbols,CN(T2) = {p, q, t} ⊂268
{p, q, t, u, v} = F2 ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ S2 ∪ D2}. Namely, the two rules r2 and r4 are not269
activated.270
It is also easy to show that CN is monotonic. Note that a similar result was shown in [25]271
for the logic underlying the ASPIC system [8].272
Property 4 Let T and T ′ be two theories. If T ⊑ T ′ then CN(T ) ⊆ CN(T ′).273
Let us now introduce the key notion of option which is useful for characterizing the274
extensions of argumentation systems under various semantics. An option is a maximal (for275
set inclusion) consistent sub-theory of a given theory.276
Deﬁnition 9 (Option) Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory. An option of T is a sub-theory277
T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) of T such that:278
• F ′ ⊆ F , S ′ ⊆ S and D′ ⊆ D279
• CN(T ′) is consistent280
• ∄T ′′ ⊑ T such that T ′ ⊏ T ′′ and CN(T ′′) is consistent.281
Opt(T ) denotes the set of all options of T .282
Let us illustrate this new notion by the following example.283
Example 3 Consider T3 such that F3, S3, D3 are as follows.284
F3
⎧⎨
⎩
p
q
¬s
S3
{
t, v → s (r1) D3
⎧⎨
⎩
p ⇒ t (r2)
q ⇒ u (r3)
u ⇒ v (r4)
285
The theory T3 has seven options:286
• O1 = (F3,S3, {r2, r3})287
• O2 = (F3,S3, {r2, r4})288
• O3 = (F3,S3, {r3, r4})289
• O4 = (F3,∅,D3)290
• O5 = ({p, q},S3,D3)291
• O6 = ({p,¬s},S3,D3)292
• O7 = ({q,¬s},S3,D3)293
A theory has at least one option which is the theory itself in case it is consistent. This is294
the case in Example 2: Opt(T2) = {T2}.295
Property 5 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.296
• Opt(T ) = ∅.297
• Opt(T ) = {T } iff CN(T ) is consistent.298
We show next that options are all pairwise distinct.299
Proposition 1 For all O,O′ ∈ Opt(T ), if CN(O) = CN(O′), then O = O′.300
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The deﬁnition of option does not make any difference between the strict part of a the-301
ory (i.e., its facts and strict rules) and its defeasible part. In rule systems [24], the former302
takes precedence over the latter since it represents the “certain” information of a theory. For303
instance, in default logic the certain part belongs to every extension of a theory [5]. This304
precedence is captured by the following notion of preferred option.305
Deﬁnition 10 (Preferred option) Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory. A preferred option of T is306
a sub-theory T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) of T such that:307
• F ′ = F and S ′ = S, D′ ⊆ D,308
• CN(T ′) is consistent,309
• ∀r ∈ D\D′, CN((F,S,D′ ∪ {r})) is inconsistent.310
POpt(T ) denotes the set of all preferred options of T .311
Let us illustrate this notion by an example.312
Example 3 (Cont) The theory T3 has three preferred options: O1, O2 and O3. ⊓⊔313
Unlike options, the defeasible rules of a theory do not necessarily belong to at least one314
preferred option of the theory as shown by the following example.315
Example 4 The theory T4 such that316
F4
{
p
q S4
{
p → s (r1) D4
{
p ⇒ ¬s (r2)317
has a single preferred option O = (F4,S4,∅) which does not contain the unique defeasible318
rule r2.319
Every preferred option is an option. The converse holds only when the theory is consistent320
in which case the latter is the only (preferred) option (cf. Property 5).321
Property 6 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.322
• POpt(T ) ⊆ Opt(T ).323
• Opt(T ) ⊆ POpt(T ) iff CN(T ) is consistent.324
A theory may not have preferred options. This is in particular the case when the strict part325
(the set of facts and strict rules) is inconsistent.326
Property 7 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.327
• POpt(T ) = ∅ iff CN((F,S,∅)) is inconsistent.328
• For all r ∈ D, if CN((F,S, {r})) is consistent, then there exists a preferred option O329
such that (F,S, {r}) ⊑ O.330
Notice that the set of consequences of an (preferred) option is not necessarily maximal331
for set inclusion as shown by Example 3.332
Example 3 (Cont) We have CN(O1) = {p, q,¬s, t, u} and CN(O2) = {p, q,¬s, t}. Thus,333
CN(O2) ⊆ CN(O1). ⊓⊔334
Notations For a set B of theories, we denote the set of its maximal elements as Max(B) =335
{T ∈ B | ∄T ′ ∈ B such that CN(T )  CN(T ′)}.336
123
Journal: 10115 Article No.: 1227 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/6/7 Pages: 45 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
L. Amgoud, P. Besnard
Note that in general, maximal preferred options may be different from maximal options.337
Consider, for instance, the theory in Example 3. Its maximal options are O4 and O5, while338
its maximal preferred options are O1 and O3.339
340 Let us now introduce the concept of free part of a theory T = (F,S,D). It is the sub-1
theory that is made of the set of facts, the set of strict rules and the defeasible rules which342
are involved in every preferred option of T .343
Deﬁnition 11 (Free sub-theory) The free sub-theory of a theory T = (F,S,D) is344
Free(T ) = (F,S,
⋂
(F,S,Di )∈POpt(T )
Di ).345
The following result summarizes some basic properties of this sub-theory.346
Property 8 Let T be a theory.347
• For any O ∈ POpt(T ), Free(T ) ⊑ O348
• CN(Free(T )) is consistent349
4 Rule-based argumentation systems350
In this section, we propose an instantiation of Dung’s framework that allows reasoning351
about defeasible information, i.e., drawing conclusions from a theory T = (F,S,D). The352
instantiation is referred to as argumentation system keeping thus the term framework for the353
abstract formalism of Dung. The backbone of an argumentation system is naturally the notion354
of argument. Intuitively, an argument is a justiﬁcation of a claim, i.e., it provides evidence355
that the claim is true. Thus, it should satisfy at least the three following basic properties:356
(i) internal coherence, (ii) relevance to the claim it justiﬁes and (iii) truth preserving (i.e.,357
it guarantees the truth of the claim). It is true that humans’ arguments may be inconsistent,358
but they are seen as fallacious by reasonable people. Furthermore, the topic of the paper is359
not reasoning about humans’ arguments. It is rather reasoning about inconsistent theories by360
using arguments as a building block of the proposed logic.361
Deﬁnition 12 (Argument) Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory. An argument deﬁned from T is362
a pair (d, x) such that:363
• x ∈ L364
• d is a derivation schema for x from T (Truth preserving)365
• Seq(d) is consistent (Internal coherence)366
• ∄T ′ ⊏ (Facts(d),Strict(d),Def(d)) such that x ∈ CN(T ′) (Relevance)367
An argument (d, x) is strict iff Def(d) = ∅.368
Example 1 (Cont) Below are the nine arguments that are built from the theory T1.369
• (〈(p, σ )〉, p)370
• (〈(q, σ )〉, q)371
• (〈(p, σ ), (q, r6)〉, q)372
• (〈(p, σ ), (s, r1)〉, s)373
• (〈(q, σ ), (¬s, r2)〉,¬s)374
• (〈(p, σ ), (q, r6), (¬s, r2)〉,¬s)375
• (〈(p, σ ), (s, r1), (u, r3)〉, u)376
123
Journal: 10115 Article No.: 1227 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/6/7 Pages: 45 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
A formal characterization of the outcomes of rule-based…
• (〈(q, σ ), (¬s, r2), (t, r4)〉, t)377
• (〈(p, σ ), (q, r6), (¬s, r2), (u, r3)〉, t)378
Note that there is no argument in favor of v since all derivation schemas for v are inconsistent.379
Derivations (4) and (5) do not give birth to arguments since they are not minimal. ⊓⊔380
Notations Let T be a theory, Arg(T ) denotes the set of all arguments built from T in the381
sense of Deﬁnition 12. If a = (d, x) is an argument, then Conc(a) = x . For a382
set E of arguments, Concs(E) = {x | (d, x) ∈ E} and Th(E) is a theory such383
that384
Th(E) =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈E
Facts(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Strict(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ .385
The following result shows that an argument provides a minimal derivation schema for a386
conclusion.387
Theorem 1 Let T be a theory. For any consistent sequence d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 from388
T , the following two statements are equivalent:389
• (d, x) is an argument (from T )390
• d is a focused derivation schema from T such that x = xn391
An argument may have several sub-parts, each of which may give birth to an argument,392
called sub-argument of the original argument.393
Deﬁnition 13 (Sub-argument) An argument (d, x) is a sub-argument of (d ′, x ′) iff394
(Facts(d), Strict(d), Def(d)) ⊑ (Facts(d ′), Strict(d ′), Def(d ′)).395
Notations The function Sub(.) returns the set of all sub-arguments of a given argument.396
Example 1 (Cont) The argument (〈(q, σ ), (¬s, r2)〉,¬s) has two sub-arguments: (〈(q, σ )〉,397
q) and itself. By contrast, (〈(q, σ )〉, q) is not a sub-argument of (〈(p, σ ), (q, r6)〉, q). ⊓⊔398
Property 9 If (d, x) is a sub-argument of (d ′, x ′), then Seq(d) ⊆ Seq(d ′).399
The converse is not true as shown next.400
Example 5 Consider the two arguments a and b:401
• a = (〈(p, σ ), (t, p → t)〉, t)402
• b = (〈(p, σ ), (q, p → q), (t, q ⇒ t)〉, t)403
Note that Seq(a) = {p, t} ⊆ {p, q, t} = Seq(b) but a is not a sub-argument of b since the404
theory ({p}, {p → t}, σ ) is not a sub-theory of ({p}, {p → q}, {q ⇒ t}).405
Argumentation systems that use a Tarskian logic such as propositional logic may have406
inﬁnite sets of arguments even when the theories (called knowledge bases) over which they407
are built are themselves ﬁnite (cf. [26]). We show that this is not the case for rule-based408
argumentation systems. Indeed, the sets of arguments are ﬁnite as soon as the theories are409
ﬁnite.410
Proposition 2 If a theory T is finite, then Arg(T ) is finite.411
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The set of arguments built from a given theory cannot be empty since the set of facts of a412
theory contains at least ⊤.413
Property 10 For a theory T = (F,S,D), Arg(T ) = ∅.414
The construction of arguments in all existing structured argumentation systems is a415
monotonic process. By structured systems, we mean argumentation systems that build their416
arguments from knowledge bases encoded in particular logics. These include ASPIC [8],417
ASPIC+ [9], DeLP [10], ABA [27] and those discussed in [4]. Thus, unlike Dung’s frame-418
work where arguments are abstract entities, in structured systems arguments have a clear419
origin and a precise structure. Hunter studied in [25] the properties of the logics underlying420
existing structured systems. The results show that the set of arguments built from a knowl-421
edge base cannot be shrunk when the base is extended by new information. The following422
result shows that this property holds also for the kind of logic discussed in this paper.423
Proposition 3 Let T and T ′ be two theories. If T ⊑ T ′, then Arg(T ) ⊆ Arg(T ′).424
A rule-based instantiation of Dung’s abstract framework is deﬁned as follows:425
Deﬁnition 14 (Argumentation system) An argumentation system deﬁned over a theory T =426
(F,S,D) is a pair H = (Arg(T ),R) where Arg(T ) is the set of arguments built from T427
in the sense of Deﬁnition 12 and R ⊆ Arg(T )× Arg(T ) is an attack relation.428
For the sake of generality, the attack relation of an argumentation system is left unspecified429
in the sequel. Thus, it may be instantiated in different ways. In existing rule-based argumen-430
tation systems like the ASPIC system as deﬁned in [8,17] and its extended version ASPIC+431
[9], three kinds of attack relations are used: (i) rebut, initially proposed in [28], which requires432
that two arguments have opposite conclusions, (ii) assumption attack, proposed also in [28],433
according to which an argument undermines a premise of another argument, and (iii) under-434
cut, proposed in [16], which allows an argument to prevent the application of a defeasible435
rule in another argument. The two ﬁrst relations are conflict-dependent, i.e., they capture436
the inconsistency of the theory over which an argumentation system is built. Such relations437
should show no attack from argument a to b unless their derivation schemas contain opposite438
literals.439
Deﬁnition 15 (Conflict-dependency) Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation sys-440
tem. The attack relation R is conflict-dependent iff for all (d, x), (d ′, x ′) ∈ Arg(T ), if441
(d, x) R (d ′, x ′) then Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent.442
An important feature of conﬂict-dependent attack relations is that they do not admit self-443
attacking arguments, mainly since arguments are consistent.444
Proposition 4 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system. If R is conflict-445
dependent, then for all a ∈ Arg(T ) (a, a) /∈ R.446
Conﬂict-dependency is somehow related to the notion of conﬂict-freeness of sets of argu-447
ments. Indeed, when the attack relation is conﬂict-dependent, the set of arguments built from448
any consistent theory is conﬂict-free with respect to this relation.449
Proposition 5 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T .450
For every T ′ ⊑ T , if CN(T ′) is consistent and R is conflict-dependent, then Arg(T ′) is451
conflict-free.452
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Another feature of all the attack relations in existing rule-based argumentation systems is453
the fact that they privilege strict arguments.454
Deﬁnition 16 (Strict argument precedence) Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation455
system built over a theory T . An attack relation R privileges strict arguments iff for all456
a = (d, x), b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ Arg(T ), if a is strict and Seq(d)∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent, then457
aRb.458
A consequence of this property is that the set Arg(Free(T )) is admissible (i.e., it is459
conﬂict-free and defends all its elements). We will show in a subsequent section that this460
result is crucial for characterizing ideal extension.461
Theorem 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =462
(F,S,D) such that CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent. If R is conflict-dependent and privileges463
strict arguments, then Arg(Free(T )) is an admissible set of H.464
Unless stated otherwise, in what follows we do not make any assumption about the attack465
relation of a rule-based argumentation system. However, the arguments of the latter are466
evaluated using any of the semantics recalled in Deﬁnition 3. The extensions of a system467
are used for deﬁning the plausible conclusions to be drawn from the theory over which the468
system is built. A literal is a plausible conclusion of a system iff it is a common conclusion469
to all the extensions.470
Deﬁnition 17 (Plausible conclusions) Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system471
built over a theory T . The set of plausible conclusions of H under semantics x is472
Output(H) =
{
{z ∈ L | ∀E ∈ Extx (H), ∃a ∈ E s.t. Conc(a) = z} if Extx (H) = ∅
∅ else473
The set of plausible conclusions coincides with the set of common conclusions of the474
extensions, of course when extensions exist.475
Property 11 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such476
that Extx (H) = ∅ where x is any of the reviewed semantics. The equality Output(H) =477 ⋂
Ei∈Extx (H) Concs(Ei ) holds.478
Finally, it is obvious that the plausible conclusions of an argumentation system are con-479
sequences of the theory over which it is built.480
Property 12 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T . The481
inclusion Output(H) ⊆ CN(T ) holds under any extension-based semantics.482
It is worth noticing that under admissible semantics, the set of plausible conclusions of any483
argumentation system is empty. This is mainly due to the fact that the empty set is always484
an admissible extension. This makes this semantics unsuitable for defeasible reasoning.485
Complete semantics suffers from the same problem. Indeed, since under this semantics486
extensions are not maximal for set inclusion, the empty set may be an extension leading487
thus to an empty set of plausible conclusions. Stable semantics may also be unsuitable for488
argumentation systems that do not have extensions.However,we show in a subsequent section489
that rule-based systems that satisfy some desirable properties do have stable extensions, in490
particular when the attack relation is conﬂict-dependent.491
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5 Postulates for rule-based argumentation systems492
Like any reasoning model, argumentation systems should enjoy some desirable properties or493
rationality postulates that ensure their soundness. The ﬁrst work on postulates in argumen-494
tation was done by [17] in the context of rule-based systems. Starting from the observation495
that some existing systems like those proposed in [12,29] suffer from two main problems: (i)496
returning inconsistent sets of plausible conclusions and (ii) forgetting intuitive conclusions,497
the authors proposed three postulates which prevent the encountered problems. In what fol-498
lows, we recall the three postulates and propose three new ones. The ﬁrst postulate proposed499
in [17] concerns the consistency of the set of conclusions supported by every extension.500
Postulate 1 (Consistency) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ),R) built over a theory501
T = (F,S,D) satisfies consistency under semantics x iff for any E ∈ Extx (H), Concs(E)502
is consistent.503
A rule-based system which satisﬁes this postulate has necessarily a consistent set of504
plausible conclusions.505
Property 13 [17] If an argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) satisfies consistency under506
semantics x (x being any extension-based semantics), then Output(H) is consistent.507
The second postulate ensures a form of “completeness” of the outputs of an argumentation508
system. It says that if there is an argument with conclusion x in an extension of the system,509
and there exists a strict rule x → y in the theory over which the system is built, then y510
should also be supported by an argument in the same extension. Recall that a strict rule has511
no exception. Thus, as soon as x is true, y holds for sure.512
Postulate 2 (Closure under strict rules) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ),R) built513
over a theory T = (F,S,D) is closed under strict rules under semantics x iff for any514
E ∈ Extx (H), Concs(E) = CN((Concs(E),S,∅)).515
If an argumentation system is closed under strict rules, then its set of plausible conclusions516
is also closed under strict rules.517
Property 14 [17] Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory518
T = (F,S,D). If H is closed under strict rules under semantics x (x being any extension-519
based semantics), then Output(H) = CN((Output(H),S,∅)).520
A third postulate, called indirect consistency, was proposed in [17]. It ensures that every521
closed (under strict rules) extension should satisfy consistency. It was shown that a system that522
satisﬁes consistency and closure under strict rules satisﬁes this form of indirect consistency.523
Property 15 [17] Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory524
T = (F , S, D). If H satisfies consistency and is closed under strict rules under semantics x525
(x being any extension-based semantics), then for any E ∈ Extx (H),CN((Concs(E),S,∅))526
is consistent.527
It is worth mentioning that the three previous results hold for any attack relation and528
under any extension-based acceptability semantics, thus under any of the semantics recalled529
in Deﬁnition 3 and others like recursive semantics [20].530
531
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In any axiomatic approach, the axioms (or postulates) should ideally all be independent532
from each other, i.e., none is deduced from the others. Thus, in the sequel indirect consistency533
is abandoned since it follows from Postulates 1 and 2. We propose next three new postulates534
which were already deﬁned in [30] for argumentation systems that use a logic in the sense of535
[22]. The ﬁrst one says that if an argument belongs to an extension, then all its sub-arguments536
should be in the extension. Thus, an argument cannot be accepted if one of its sub-parts is537
questionable. This is a natural requirement since plausible conclusions inferred from a theory538
rely on their supporting arguments which should be unassailable.539
Postulate 3 (Closure under sub-arguments) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R)540
built over a theory T = (F,S,D) is closed under sub-arguments under semantics x iff for541
any E ∈ Extx (H), if a ∈ E then Sub(a) ⊆ E .542
Argumentation systems that satisfy both consistency and closure under sub-arguments543
enjoy a strong version of consistency. Indeed, the set of consequences that follow from the544
theory of an extension is consistent.545
Proposition 6 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =546
(F,S,D) such that Extx (H) = ∅ (x being any extension-based semantics). If H satisfies547
consistency and closure under sub-arguments, then for any E ∈ Extx (H), CN(Th(E)) is548
consistent.549
Let us illustrate this result with an example.550
Example 6 Let T5 = (F5,S5,D5) be a theory such that S5 = ∅ and551
F5
{
x
¬x
D5
{
x ⇒ y (r1)
¬x ⇒ z (r2)
552
Consider the two arguments (d1, y), (d2, z) with d1 = 〈(x, σ ), (y, r1)〉 and d2 =553
〈(¬x, σ ), (z, r2)〉. Assume that the set E = {(d1, y), (d2, z)} is an extension of (Arg(T5),R)554
under a given semantics. Clearly, CN((Concs(E),S,∅)) = {y, z} is consistent. However,555
Th(E) = T and CN(T ) = {x,¬x, y, z} is inconsistent. Proposition 6 ensures that the argu-556
mentation system (Arg(T5),R) violates at least one of the consistency or closure under557
sub-arguments postulates.558
Since facts and strict rules are the certain part in a theory (facts being observable and559
strict rules having no exceptions), they should be plausible conclusions of any argumentation560
system. It is worth mentioning that this principle is applied, for instance, in default logic561
where the non-defeasible information of a default theory is part of all extensions [5]. Of562
course this makes sense when the non-defeasible information is consistent.563
Postulate 4 (Strict precedence) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) built over a564
theory T = (F,S,D) satisfies strict precedence under semantics x iff CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆565
Output(H).566
Notice that argumentation systems that have no extensions violate this postulate. Similarly,567
systems that evaluate their arguments using a semantics which considers the empty set as an568
extension (like admissible semantics) violate strict precedence. Such systems are thus not569
suitable for defeasible reasoning since they may miss intuitive conclusions.570
Proposition 7 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory571
T = (F,S,D) such that ∅ ∈ Extx (H). H violates strict precedence under semantics x.572
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We show next that if an argumentation system satisﬁes consistency and strict precedence,573
then the strict part of the theory over which it is built is consistent.574
Proposition 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =575
(F,S,D) such that Extx (H) = ∅. If H satisfies consistency and strict precedence under576
semantics x, then CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent.577
The last postulate ensures a form of completeness of the extensions of an argumentation sys-578
tem under any semantics. It says that if the sequence of an argument is part of the conclusions579
of a given extension, then the argument should belong to the extension. Informally: If each580
step in the argument is good enough to be in the extension, then so is the argument itself. It581
is worth pointing out that this postulates holds for both strict and defeasible rules.582
Postulate 5 (Exhaustiveness) An argumentation system H = (Arg(T ),R) built over a583
theory T = (F,S,D) satisfies exhaustiveness under semantics x iff for any E ∈ Extx (H),584
for any (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ), if Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E), then (d, x) ∈ E .585
Argumentation systems that satisfy exhaustiveness and closure under sub-arguments have586
complete extensions, i.e., they are closed in terms of arguments.587
Proposition 9 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such that Extx (H) = ∅588
(x being any extension-based semantics). If H is closed under sub-arguments and satisfies589
exhaustiveness under semantics x, then for all E ∈ Extx (H), E = Arg(Th(E)).590
When an argumentation system satisﬁes strict precedence and exhaustiveness, then its591
strict arguments are part of any extension. This holds under any extension-based semantics.592
Proposition 10 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅593
(under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies exhaustiveness and strict precedence,594
then for any E ∈ Ext(H), Arg((F,S,∅)) ⊆ E .595
An axiomatic approach should obey an important feature: The postulates should be com-596
patible, i.e., they can be satisﬁed all together by an argumentation system under a given597
semantics. Fortunately, this is the case of the ﬁve postulates discussed in this section.598
Proposition 11 The five postulates are compatible.599
The four postulates (consistency, closure under sub-arguments, closure under strict rules,600
strict precedence) are independent. None of them follows from a subset of the three others.601
However, as will be shown in the next section, exhaustiveness follows from consistency and602
closure under sub-arguments when an argumentation system uses a conﬂict-dependent attack603
relation and naive or stable semantics for evaluating arguments.604
6 Outcomes of rule-based argumentation systems605
This section analyzes the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems under the reviewed606
semantics, i.e., those recalled in Deﬁnition 3, that are suitable for defeasible reasoning. Recall607
that complete semantics is not a good candidate for such reasoning since its extensions are608
not maximal (for set inclusion) and may thus lead to an empty set of plausible conclusions,609
and missing intuitive conclusions. We analyze the extensions under each semantics. Indeed,610
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we characterize the set Concs(.) of conclusions and the theory Th(.) of each extension. We611
also characterize the set Output(.) of plausible conclusions that are drawn by a rule-based612
argumentation system from a theory.613
Note that the argumentation systemdescribed in Sect. 4 is not fully speciﬁed since its attack614
relation is left undeﬁned and may thus be instantiated in different ways. For the purpose of615
our study, we do not need to consider a particular attack relation. Since any reasonable616
argumentation system should satisfy the discussed postulates, throughout this section we617
only focus on systems that satisfy the postulates. Such systems exist and ASPIC, deﬁned618
in [17], is one of them. Indeed, it was shown in [17] that ASPIC, which uses restricted619
rebut as attack relation, satisﬁes consistency and closure under both sub-arguments and strict620
rules under all Dung’s semantics. Furthermore, the attack relation in ASPIC privileges strict621
arguments (by deﬁnition) and the strict part of a theory is assumed to be consistent. Thus, the622
system satisﬁes strict precedence under the same semantics. Finally, from our Proposition623
15 (respectively Proposition 13), it follows that it also satisﬁes exhaustiveness under stable624
(respectively naive) semantics. The results we provide next hold for any instantiation of the625
attack relationR. This means that whatever the attack relation that is considered, the outcome626
will be the same. This shows also that all the reasonable rule-based argumentation systems627
that can be built over the same theory are equivalent [31,32], in the sense they provide the628
same extensions and the set of plausible conclusions under a given semantics.629
Before presenting the formal results concerning the reviewed semantics, below are some630
results that hold under any extension-based semantics, thus under all the reviewed semantics631
but also under several other semantics (e.g., recursive semantics [20], the one used in DeLP632
system [10], stage semantics [21], …). The ﬁrst result characterizes the set of conclusions of633
each extension of an argumentation system which is closed under sub-arguments.634
Proposition 12 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) =635
∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H is closed under sub-arguments, then for any636
E ∈ Ext(H),637
• Concs(E) = X ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ Y ∪ Z} where Th(E) = (X, Y, Z)638
• Concs(E) = CN(Th(E))639
• ∀(d, x) ∈ Arg(Th(E)), Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E)640
The next result shows that if an argumentation system over a theory satisﬁes strict prece-641
dence, closure under both sub-arguments and strict rules, then the set of literals deduced642
from Th(E), the theory of an extension E , is exactly the same set that is obtained from Th(E)643
extended by all facts and strict rules which are not in Th(E).644
Theorem 3 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =645
(F,S,D) such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies strict646
precedence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments, then for any E ∈ Ext(H),647
CN (Th(E)) = CN
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝F,S, ⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ .648
We also show that the theory of an extension can be extended into a sub-theory (of the649
argumentation system) which infers, using the notion of derivation, all the conclusions that650
are supported by arguments of the extension. This (i.e., Theorem 4) will be useful in proving651
various results in the next sections.652
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Theorem 4 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =653
(F,S,D) such that Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). If H satisfies strict654
precedence, and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments, then for any E ∈ Ext(H),655
Concs(E) = CN(O) for O = (F,S, ζ ) such that656
ζ =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ ∪ {r | r ∈ D and Body(r)  CN(Th(E))} .657
6.1 Naive semantics658
Before characterizing the extensions as well as the plausible conclusions of a rule-based659
argumentation system, let us ﬁrst show some additional links between the postulates in the660
particular case of naive semantics. The ﬁrst result shows that exhaustiveness follows from661
consistency and closure under sub-arguments. This is the case when the attack relation is662
conﬂict-dependent.663
Proposition 13 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T664
such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments665
under naive semantics, H satisfies exhaustiveness under naive semantics.666
The second result shows thatwhen an argumentation system is closed under sub-arguments667
and satisﬁes the consistency postulate under naive semantics, then every naive extension of668
the system is closed in terms of arguments.669
Proposition 14 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory670
T such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-671
arguments under naive semantics. For any E ∈ Extn(H), E = Arg(Th(E)).672
Strict precedence is problematic in case of naive semantics since it may be violated by a673
rule-based argumentation system. This is mainly due to the fact that the orientation of attacks674
is not taken into account when computing naive extensions; thus, there is no way to enforce675
the postulate. We show next that strict arguments are part of any naive extension only when676
they neither are attacked nor attack any argument.677
Theorem 5 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =678
(F,S,D) such that R is conflict-dependent. For any E ∈ Extn(H), Arg((F, S,∅)) ⊆ E iff679
for any a ∈ Arg((F, S,∅)), ∄b ∈ Arg(T ) such that aRb or bRa.680
We have previously shown that the ﬁve postulates are compatible in the general case.681
Indeed, under stable and preferred semantics, it was shown that the ASPIC system satisﬁes682
all the postulates. In case of naive semantics, this is not always true. Strict precedence is683
not compatible with consistency when the strict part is inconsistent, or it is consistent but684
in conﬂict with the defeasible part. For instance, any argumentation system built over the685
theory of Example 3 will violate at least one of the two postulates under naive semantics.686
Theorem 6 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =687
(F,S,D) such that R is conflict-dependent. If∃a, b ∈ Arg(T ) such that a ∈ Arg((F,S,∅))688
and Conc(a) = ¬Conc(b), then H cannot satisfy both strict precedence and consistency689
under naive semantics.690
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In case of the ASPIC system, the argument b cannot be strict since the strict part (i.e.,691
CN(F,S,∅)) is assumed to be consistent. Moreover, there is only one conﬂict between a and692
b and which emanates from a since strict arguments cannot be attacked by defeasible ones.693
Thus, strict precedence is violated.694
We show next that, assuming consistency and closure under sub-arguments, naive exten-695
sions are maximal.696
Theorem 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such697
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments698
under naive semantics. For all E, E ′ ∈ Extn(H), if Concs(E ′) ⊆ Concs(E) then E = E ′.699
The following theorem characterizes naive extensions. It says that every naive extension700
of an argumentation systemwhich satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-arguments has701
a unique corresponding maximal option in the theory at hand.702
Theorem 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T703
such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-704
arguments under naive semantics. For any E ∈ Extn(H), there exists a unique option705
O ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).706
Note that the inclusion Th(E) ⊆ O is due to the fact that a theory Th(E) of an extension707
E contains only activated (strict and defeasible) rules, while maximal options may contain708
non-activated ones. Thus, the elements which in O but not in Th(E) are non-activated rules.709
Notations For E any extension of H such that O in Max(Opt(T )) satisﬁes Th(E) ⊑ O and710
Concs(E) = CN(O), let711
Option(E) def= O.712
We prove that no two naive extensions return the same option. Moreover, every extension is713
exactly the set of all arguments that can be built from its corresponding option.714
Theorem 9 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such715
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments716
under naive semantics.717
• For all E, E ′ ∈ Extn(H), if Option(E) = Option(E ′), then E = E ′718
• For any E ∈ Extn(H), E = Arg(Option(E))719
We have shown that each naive extension captures exactly one maximal option and it720
supports all, and only, the consequences of that option. Theorem 10 states that every maximal721
option has a corresponding naive extension. So, there is a bijection from the set of naive722
extensions to the set of maximal options.723
Theorem 10 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such724
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments725
under naive semantics.726
• For any O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H)727
• For any O ∈ Max(Opt(T )), O = Option(Arg(O))728
• For all O,O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )), if Arg(O) = Arg(O′) then O = O′729
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Example 3 (Cont) The theory T3 has seven options, of which only two are maximal:730
Max(Opt(T3)) = {O4,O5}. For all argumentation system H built over T3, if the attack731
relation of H is to be conﬂict-dependent and consistency and closure under sub-arguments732
satisﬁed, then Extn(H) = {Arg(O4),Arg(O5)}.733
From the previous results, it follows that there is a bijection between the set of naive734
extensions of an argumentation system and the maximal options of the theory over which the735
system is built.736
Corollary 1 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such737
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments738
under naive semantics. There is a bijection between Extn(H) and Max(Opt(T )).739
Theprevious results require only the satisfaction of twopostulates: consistency and closure740
under sub-arguments. We show next that when a rule-based argumentation system satisﬁes741
all the ﬁve postulates, there is a bijection between the set of naive extensions of the system742
and the maximal preferred options of the theory over which it is built. The reason is that in743
such a case, the maximal options of the theory coincide with the maximal preferred ones.744
Recall that in general, maximal preferred options may be different from maximal options.745
Theorem 11 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such746
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency, strict precedence and closure under747
both strict rules and sub-arguments under naive semantics. The equality Max(POpt(T )) =748
Max(Opt(T )) holds.749
Corollary 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such750
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency, strict precedence and closure under751
both strict rules and sub-arguments under naive semantics. There is a bijection between752
Extn(H) and Max(POpt(T )).753
It is possible to delimit the number of naive extensions of any argumentation system that754
satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-arguments. It is exactly the number of maximal755
options of the theory at hand.756
Corollary 3 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such757
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments758
under naive semantics. The equality |Extn(H)| = |Max(Opt(T ))| holds.759
It follows also that when a theory is ﬁnite, then any system built over it has a ﬁnite number760
of naive extensions.761
Corollary 4 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such762
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments763
under naive semantics. If T is finite, then H has a finite number of naive extensions.764
What about the plausible conclusions that are drawn from a theory using an argumentation765
system that satisﬁes the postulates? From the previous results, it is easy to show that they are766
the literals that follow from all the maximal options.767
Theorem 12 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such768
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments769
under naive semantics.770
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈Max(Opt(T ))
CN(Oi )771
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Example 3 (Cont) Any argumentation systemH that can be built over the theory T3 and has a772
conﬂict-dependent attack relation and satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-arguments773
will have as output the set Output(H) = CN(O4) ∩ CN(O5) = {p, q, t, u, v}.774
Let us summarize the main results: under naive semantics, any rule-based argumentation775
system may violate strict precedence. However, the other postulates can be satisﬁed. In such776
a case , if the attack relation is conﬂict-dependent, then any argumentation system will infer777
exactly the literals that follow from all the maximal options of the theory over which the778
system is built. This is due to the bijection that holds between the set of naive extensions and779
the set of maximal options. In case the system satisﬁes also strict precedence and closure780
under strict rules, then themaximal options of the theory coincide with themaximal preferred781
options.782
6.2 Stable semantics783
As for naive semantics, exhaustiveness follows from consistency and closure under sub-784
arguments in case of stable semantics.785
Proposition 15 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T786
such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies consistency and closure under sub-arguments787
under stable semantics, then the following two properties hold:788
• H satisfies exhaustiveness under stable semantics.789
• For any E ∈ Exts(H), E = Arg(Th(E)).790
Stable extensions of rule-based argumentation systems satisfying the ﬁve postulates return791
maximal preferred options. This means that if one instantiates Dung’s framework and does792
not get maximal preferred options with stable extensions, then the instantiation certainly793
violates at least one of the postulates. Note that strict precedence may be satisﬁed by an794
argumentation system under stable semantics while it is violated by the same system under795
naive semantics. This is due to the fact that the orientation of attacks plays an important796
role in stable semantics, then strict precedence can be enforced by choosing an appropriate797
orientation.798
Theorem 13 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system defined over a theory T799
such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies consistency, strict precedence and closure800
under both sub-arguments and strict rules under stable semantics, and Exts(H) = ∅, then801
for any E ∈ Exts(H), there exists a unique option O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that:802
• Th(E) ⊑ O803
• Concs(E) = CN(O)804
• E = Arg(O)805
Two stable extensions cannot capture the same maximal preferred option.806
Theorem 14 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system defined over a theory T807
such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies consistency, strict precedence and closure808
under both sub-arguments and strict rules under stable semantics and Exts(H) = ∅, then809
for all E, E ′ ∈ Exts(H), if Option(E) = Option(E ′) then E = E ′.810
The previous results characterize the stable extensions of rule-based argumentation sys-811
tems that satisfy the postulates. However, they do not guarantee that each maximal preferred812
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option of a theory has a corresponding stable extension. To put it differently, it does not guar-813
antee a bijection between the sets Exts(H) and Max(POpt(T )) and thus does not ensure814
the equality |Exts(H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|. In case of argumentation systems that use a815
Tarskian logic for representing information and for computing arguments, it was shown in816
[4] that this equality depends on the attack relation that is chosen. We show next that this is817
also the case for rule-based systems.818
Given T , letℜs be the set of all attack relations that are conﬂict-dependent and that ensure819
the ﬁve postulates under stable semantics:820
ℜs = {R ⊆ Arg(T ) × Arg(T ) | R is conﬂict-dependent and (Arg(T ),R) satisﬁes821
the ﬁve postulates under stable semantics for any theory T }.822
This set contains three disjoints subsets of attack relations, i.e., ℜs = ℜs1 ∪ ℜs2 ∪ ℜs3 :823
• ℜs1 : the set of relations such that |Exts(H)| = 0824
• ℜs2 : the set of relations such that |Exts(H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|825
• ℜs3 : the set of relations such that |Exts(H)| < |Max(POpt(T ))|826
Let us analyze separately each category of attack relations. The following result shows827
that the setℜs1 is empty, meaning that there is no attack relation which prevents the existence828
of stable extensions. To say it differently, any argumentation system which satisﬁes the829
postulates has at least one stable extension.830
Theorem 15 ℜs1 = ∅.831
A consequence of this postulate is that stable extensions coincide with semi-stable ones.832
Indeed, it was shown in [18] that when stable extensions exist, they coincide with semi-stable833
extensions.834
Corollary 5 For all argumentation system H = (Arg(T ),R), if R ∈ ℜs2 ∪ ℜs3 , then835
Exts(H) = Extss(H).836
From the previous results, it is possible to delimit the number of stable extensions of837
rule-based argumentation systems that satisfy the ﬁve postulates.838
Corollary 6 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system defined over a theory T839
such that R is conflict-dependent. If H satisfies the five postulates, then840
1 ≤ |Exts(H)| ≤ |Max(POpt(T ))|.841
It follows that when a theory is ﬁnite, any argumentation system built over it has a ﬁnite842
number of stable extensions.843
Corollary 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such844
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates. If T is finite, then H has a845
finite number of stable extensions.846
Attack relations of categoryℜs2 induce a bijection between the set of stable extensions of847
an argumentation system and the set of maximal preferred options of the theory over which848
the system is built. Indeed, every preferred option gives a stable extension.849
Theorem 16 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory T such that850
R ∈ ℜs2 . For any O ∈ Max(POpt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Exts(H).851
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Example 3 (Cont) The theoryT3 has seven options, ofwhich only two are preferredmaximal:852
Max(POpt(T3)) = {O1,O3}. Thus, for all argumentation system H built over T3, if the853
attack relation of H is of category ℜs2 , then Exts(H) = {Arg(O1),Arg(O3)}. Recall854
that under naive semantics, there is no argumentation system over T3 that can satisfy strict855
precedence. The ones that guarantee consistency and closure under sub-arguments will all856
have the following naive extensions: Extn(H) = {Arg(O4),Arg(O5)}.857
Argumentation systems with an attack relation from ℜs2 are coherent, meaning that the858
preferred extensions exhaust all the stable ones. It follows thus that the three semantics (semi-859
stable, stable, preferred) coincide. This means that semi-stable and preferred semantics have860
no added value with respect to stable semantics since they guarantee the same results.861
Theorem 17 For any argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) such that R ∈ ℜs2 , it holds862
Exts(H) = Extss(H) = Extp(H).863
In case an argumentation system satisﬁes strict precedence under naive semantics (see864
Theorem 5), then its extensions coincide with the stable ones. To put differently, in case865
naive semantics can guarantee strict precedence, stable semantics becomes useless since it866
provides no added value with respect to naive semantics.867
Theorem 18 For all argumentation system H = (Arg(T ), R) such that R ∈ ℜs2 , if H868
satisfies the postulates under naive semantics, then869
Extn(H) = Exts(H) = Extss(H) = Extp(H).870
Plausible conclusions of rule-based argumentation systems that use attack relations in871
categoryℜs2 are exactly the literals that follow from all the maximal preferred options of the872
theory at hand.873
Theorem 19 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such874
that R ∈ ℜs2 .875
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈ Max(POpt(T ))
CN(Oi ).876
Systems that use relations inℜs3 choose a proper subset of the maximal preferred options877
of T and make inferences from them. Their output sets are as follows:878
Theorem 20 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such879
that R ∈ ℜs3 .880
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈X
CN(Oi )881
with X = {Oi ∈ Max(POpt(T )) | Ei = Arg(Oi ) ∈ Exts(H)}.882
These attack relations introduce a critical discrimination between the maximal preferred883
options of a theory. Hence, great care must be exercised when designing rule-based argumen-884
tation systems based on stable semantics: The principles governing the interaction between885
⇒ and R must be both rigorously and meticulously speciﬁed so as to avoid trouble of which886
the following example is an easy case.887
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Example 7 Consider T6 such that F6, S6, D6 are as follows:888
F6
{
p
q S6 = ∅ D6
{
p ⇒ s (r1)
q ⇒ ¬s (r2)
889
The theory T6 has two maximal preferred options:890
• O1 = (F6,S6, {r1})891
• O2 = (F6,S6, {r2})892
For a system H whose attack relation is in ℜs3 either (i) Arg(O1) or (ii) Arg(O2) is its893
unique stable extension. In case (i), s ∈ Output(H) and ¬s /∈ Output(H).894
In case (ii), ¬s is the plausible conclusion. By the obvious symmetry (don’t be misled by895
negation!1), either choice would be arbitrary, and this is an instance where an attack relation896
from ℜs2 is alright.897
To sum up, attack relations satisfying the postulates can be split into two categories: ℜs2898
andℜs3 . Relations fromℜs2 make semi-stable semantics and preferred semantics to collapse899
into stable semantics. They offer no added value with respect to the latter. Stable semantics900
may, however, be more valuable than naive semantics. Indeed, the theories for which strict901
precedence cannot be satisﬁed under naive semantics are handled correctly under stable902
semantics. This latter can enforce the satisfaction of strict precedence if the attack relation903
is deﬁned in an appropriate way. For those theories where the postulate is satisﬁed, stable904
semantics collapses into naive semantics. With attack relations from category ℜs3 , pitfalls905
threaten as preferred options are discarded, and a lot of caremust be exercisedwhen designing906
such an argumentation system.907
6.3 Preferred semantics908
Preferred semantics was originally proposed in order to overcome the limitation of stable909
semantics which does not guarantee the existence of extensions. Indeed, any argumentation910
system has at least one preferred extension which may be empty. We show that in case of911
rule-based systems the empty set cannot be an extension.912
Theorem 21 Let H be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F,S,D) such913
that H satisfies the strict precedence postulate under preferred semantics. Extp(H) = {∅}.914
Unlike the cases of naive and stable extensions, a preferred extensionmay capture a proper915
sub-part of a maximal preferred option. For instance, it is not impossible that a preferred916
extension captures only the strict part of theory T6 in Example 7.917
Theorem 22 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such918
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics. For919
any E ∈ Extp(H), ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O).920
Each preferred extension corresponds to exactly one maximal preferred option. It either921
returns all the consequences of that option, or chooses a subset. The latter contains all the922
conclusions that follow from the strict part and some conclusions that follow using defeasible923
rules. We show next that there is at least one maximal preferred option which is captured by924
a preferred extension. This is mainly due to the fact that stable extensions exist.925
1 There is an apparent asymmetry between s and ¬s but it is meaningless because we can choose an atom
t to represent the intuitive statement formalized by ¬s and then the intuitive statement formalized by s gets
represented as ¬t . As an illustration about numbers, by letting odd instead of even, or vice versa, to be an
atom of L, asymmetry about negation could be reversed, while in both cases the meaning would be the same.
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Theorem 23 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =926
(F,S,D) such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred927
semantics. There exists O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Arg(O) ∈ Extp(H).928
Example 7 (Cont) At least one of Arg(O1) and Arg(O2) is a preferred extension of an929
argumentation system H = (Arg(T6),R) which satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates.930
Two preferred extensions refer to different preferred options.931
Theorem 24 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such that R is conflict-932
dependent and H satisfies exhaustiveness and closure under sub-arguments under preferred933
semantics. Let E, E ′ ∈ Extp(H) and O ∈ Max(POpt(T )). If Th(E) ⊑ O and Th(E ′) ⊑ O,934
then E = E ′.935
We show next that the free part of a theory, i.e., the sub-theory, which consists of the set936
of facts, the set of strict rules and the defeasible rules which are involved in every preferred937
option, is part of any preferred extension of argumentation systems that satisfy the postulates.938
Indeed, the set Arg(Free(T )) is part of every preferred extension of any argumentation939
system which satisﬁes consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under sub-940
arguments.941
Theorem 25 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system over a theory T =942
(F,S,D) such that R is conflict-dependent and privileges strict arguments (recall Defi-943
nition 16), and H satisfies consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under944
sub-arguments under preferred semantics.945
Arg(Free(T )) ⊆
⋂
Ei∈Extp(H)
Ei .946
From the previous results, it follows that the number of preferred extensions does not947
exceed the number of maximal preferred options of the theory over which the system is built.948
Theorem 26 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such949
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the fiv postulates under preferred semantics.950
1 ≤ |Extp(H)| ≤ |Max(POpt(T ))|951
When a theory is ﬁnite, any argumentation system built over it has a ﬁnite number of952
preferred extensions.953
Corollary 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such954
that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates under preferred semantics. If955
T is finite, then H has a finite number of preferred extensions.956
Let us now characterize the plausible conclusions that are drawn from a theory T by an957
argumentation system H satisfying the rationality postulates under preferred semantics. Let958
ℜp be the set of all attack relations that ensure the postulates under preferred semantics:959
ℜp = {R ⊆ Arg(T ) × Arg(T ) | R is conﬂict-dependent and (Arg(T ),R)960
satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates under preferred semantics}.961
In his seminal paper [1], Dung has shown that the stable extensions of an argumentation962
system are also preferred extensions of the system. Consequently, the set ℜp is a subset of963
ℜs .964
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Property 16 ℜp ⊆ ℜs .965
Then, ℜp contains three disjoint subsets of attack relations: ℜp = ℜp1 ∪ ℜp2 ∪ ℜp3 :966
• ℜp1 : the relations which are in ℜp ∩ ℜs1 .967
• ℜp2 : the relations which are in ℜp ∩ ℜs2 .968
• ℜp3 : the relations which are in ℜp ∩ ℜs3 .969
Let us analyze each category of attack relations separately. The ﬁrst set is empty (i.e.,970
ℜp1 = ∅) since we have shown previously that there is no attack relation which prevents an971
argumentation system from having stable extensions (ℜs1 = ∅).972
Attack relations of categoryℜp2 lead to coherent argumentation systems (i.e.,Exts(H) =973
Extp(H)) as shown in Theorem 17. Thus, preferred semantics does not provide an added974
value with respect to stable semantics. Moreover, there is a bijection between the two sets:975
Extp(H) and Max(POpt(T )).976
Corollary 9 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system over a theory T such that977
R ∈ ℜp2 .978
• For any E ∈ Extp(H), ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Concs(E) = CN(O) and979
Th(E) ⊑ O.980
• For any O ∈ Max(POpt(T )), Arg(O) ∈ Extp(H).981
• For any O ∈ Max(POpt(T )), O = Option(Arg(O)).982
In the case of attack relations of categoryℜp2 , Arg(Free(T )) is equal to the intersection983
of all preferred extensions.984
Theorem 27 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system over a theory T . If R ∈985
ℜp2 , then986
Arg(Free(T )) =
⋂
Ei∈Extx (H)
Ei987
where x ∈ {p, s, ss}.988
The output of an argumentation system is in this case the same as under stable semantics,989
i.e., the plausible conclusions given in Theorem 19.990
Let us now analyze attack relations of category ℜp3 . Remember that in this case stable991
semantics chooses only somemaximal preferred options of the theory at hand. Four situations992
may be encountered:993
1. The stable extensions and the preferred extensions of an argumentation system coincide.994
Thus, preferred semantics has no added value with respect to stable semantics. Moreover,995
it may lead to arbitrary results as discussed in the previous subsection when R ∈ ℜs3996
(see Example 7 where one of the defeasible rules is chosen in an arbitrary way).997
2. The preferred extensions consider additional but not all maximal preferred options (other998
than the ones chosen by stable semantics). This case is similar to the previous one, and the999
argumentation system may return arbitrary results. Note that Example 7 is not sufﬁcient1000
to show this case since stable semantics will return one of O1 and O2 while preferred1001
semantics will return the second one, which corresponds more to the case above. In order1002
to exemplify this case, consider the following theory T7.1003
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Example 8 Consider T7 such that F7, S7, D7 are as follows:1004
F7
{
p
t
S7 = ∅ D7
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
p ⇒ q (r1)
q ⇒ s (r2)
t ⇒ ¬s (r3)
t ⇒ ¬q (r4)
1005
The theory T7 has three maximal preferred options:1006
• O1 = (F7,S7, {r1, r2})1007
• O2 = (F7,S7, {r1, r3})1008
• O3 = (F7,S7, {r3, r4})1009
Assume that Arg(O1) is the single stable extension of an argumentation system H =1010
(Arg(T7),R)which satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. Thus, Arg(O1) is also a preferred extension1011
of H. Case 2 suggests either Arg(O2) or Arg(O3) (not both) is another preferred extension.1012
Thus, as in Example 7, some rules are discarded in an arbitrary way.1013
3. The preferred extensions return all the maximal preferred options of the theory. This1014
means that stable semantics chooses some maximal preferred options and preferred1015
semantics considers the remaining ones. This case coincides exactly with the case of1016
attack relations of category ℜp2 (see Theorem 19). Indeed, the argumentation system1017
returns all the conclusions that follow from all maximal preferred options of the theory.1018
Note that this output is also ensured by stable semantics when R ∈ ℜs2.1019
4. Some of the preferred extensions provide proper sub-parts of maximal preferred options.1020
In this case, the result of the argumentation system may be arbitrary as can be seen on1021
the following example.1022
Example 8 (Cont) Consider an argumentation system H = (Arg(T7),R) such that R ∈1023
ℜp3 . Assume that H has two preferred extensions: E1 and E2. From Theorem 23, one of1024
them captures necessarily a maximal preferred option. Let E1 be such extension, and let1025
Option(E1) = O1. Case 4 suggests that there is at least another preferred extension, say1026
E2 such that Option(E2) ⊏ Oi (i = 2, 3). Assume that i = 2 and Th(E2) = (F7,S7, {r3}).1027
Note that since preferred extensions are maximal for set inclusion, it cannot be the case that1028
Th(E2) = (F7,S7, {r1}) (since E2 would be a subset of E1). One can notice that among the1029
four rules, r4 is not used, which is unjustiﬁed.1030
To sum up, attack relations of category ℜp3 may lead either to arbitrary results or to1031
results which can be provided by stable semantics.1032
6.4 Grounded: ideal semantics1033
This section analyzes the outcomes of rule-based systems under grounded and ideal seman-1034
tics. Recall that both semantics ensure only one extension, which may be empty, for an1035
argumentation system. Moreover, the grounded extension GE(H) of an argumentation sys-1036
tem H is a sub-part of the ideal extension IE(H) of the same system. Consequently, the1037
conclusions supported by the former are also supported by the latter, i.e., Concs(GE(H)) ⊆1038
Concs(IE(H)). Note also that the output set of an argumentation system is exactly1039
Concs(GE(H)) (respectively Concs(IE(H))) in case of grounded (respectively ideal)1040
semantics. Before presenting the formal results, it is worth mentioning that an argumentation1041
system that satisﬁes the postulates under preferred semantics does not necessarily satisfy the1042
postulates under grounded/ideal semantics. Similarly, a system that satisﬁes the postulates1043
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under ideal semantics may violate some of the postulates under grounded semantics. That is1044
why in the following we study each semantics separately.1045
The ideal extension, introduced in [19], is a maximal (for set inclusion) admissible set that1046
is a subset of each preferred extension. In case of a rule-based argumentation system which1047
satisﬁes the postulates, it returns a sub-part of one of the preferred options of the theory over1048
which the system is built. Formally:1049
Theorem 28 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under ideal seman-1050
tics, then there exists a preferred option O ∈ POpt(T ) such that Th(IE(H)) ⊑ O and1051
CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Concs(IE(H)) ⊆ CN(O).1052
Note that the outcome under ideal semantics may be arbitrary. This is in particular the case1053
when the semantics selects one preferred option and draws all the conclusions that follow1054
from this option. However, when the attack relation is of category ℜp2 and privileges strict1055
arguments (recall Deﬁnition 16), then the ideal extension is exactly the set Arg(Free(T )).1056
Theorem 29 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under ideal semantics1057
and R ∈ ℜp2 and privileges strict arguments, then IE(H) = Arg(Free(T )).1058
The above result shows that ideal semantics allows the inference of literals only from the1059
free part of a theory.1060
Corollary 10 If an argumentation systemH satisfies the five postulates under ideal semantics1061
and R ∈ ℜp2 and privileges strict arguments, then Output(H) = CN(Free(T )).1062
Note that in this case grounded extension may be more cautious than ideal one and may1063
miss intuitive (free) conclusions since GE(H) ⊆ Arg(Free(T )).1064
The grounded extension of any argumentation system which satisﬁes the postulates under1065
grounded semantics captures a sub-part of a preferred option, i.e., it behaves exactly like1066
ideal extension.1067
Theorem 30 If an argumentation system H satisfies the five postulates under grounded1068
semantics, then there exists a preferred option O ∈ POpt(T ) such that Th(GE(H)) ⊑ O1069
and CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Concs(GE(H)) ⊆ CN(O).1070
7 Related work1071
The abstract argumentation framework proposed by Dung [1] was used for reasoning about1072
defeasible information, and more generally for handling inconsistency. It was thus instanti-1073
ated in different ways, considering different logical languages for representing information.1074
Examples of such languages are propositional language (e.g.,[2,3]) and rule-based ones (e.g.,1075
[8,9,11,27,29,33]).1076
All the instantiations are deﬁned in a similar way: deﬁne arguments and attacks, then1077
apply Dung’s semantics on the deﬁned graph, and infer the formulas that follow from all1078
extensions. Some of these works are incomplete since there is one important step which is1079
missing: characterizing the set of inferences that are drawn from a theory/knowledge base,1080
i.e., describing formally how the output relates to the theory.1081
For ﬁlling this gap, in [4], we considered argumentation systems that use Tarskian log-1082
ics, covering thus the systems studied in [2,3]. In [11,33], we focused on rule-based logics.1083
Here we faced two issues: First, the logical languages that are considered in the literature1084
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are different. In ASPIC [8], defeasible rules express defaults and any uncertain informa-1085
tion. In ABA [27], uncertain information is encoded by assumptions. In ASPIC+ [9], several1086
types of information are considered (axioms, ordinary premises, issues, assumptions, strict1087
rules and defeasible rules). The differences between all these types are unclear, especially1088
between strict rules and axioms (both represent certain and non-defeasible information), and1089
between ordinary premises, assumptions and defeasible rules (which all represent uncertain1090
and defeasible information). Consequently, we have chosen the logical language used in the1091
ASPIC system [8,17]. It considers facts and strict rules (for encoding strict information) and1092
defeasible rules (for encoding assumptions, defeasible rules, ordinary premises). Another1093
issue with rule-based argumentation systems is that there are two types of attack relations:1094
inconsistency-based ones and undercut which amounts to blocking the application of defea-1095
sible rules. For a better understanding of each type of attack relation, we studied in [11]1096
argumentation systems that use undercut as their sole attack relation, and in this paper we1097
studied the impact of inconsistency-based ones.1098
Our formalismuses the same logical language asASPIC and amore general inconsistency-1099
based attack relation. Our results apply thus to ASPIC when its undercut relation is empty.1100
Note that our results and those from [11] should be combined for characterizing the outcomes1101
of the ASPIC system when it uses the two kinds of relations. This is left for future work.1102
ASPIC+ uses a “richer” logical language since its aim was to unify all existing argumen-1103
tation systems. It can thus be seen a union of several elementary systems: ABA for dealing1104
with assumptions, ASPIC for dealing with strict/defeasible information, and the systems1105
deﬁned in [4] for dealing with Tarskian logics. In [4], we have characterized this sub-class1106
of ASPIC+. In this paper, we characterized the sub-class capturing ASPIC.1107
The last well-known argumentation system, called ABA, cannot be compared to our for-1108
malism since the two systems use different logical languages. While ABA uses assumptions1109
for capturing the defeasible information in a theory, our formalism uses defeasible rules.1110
8 Conclusion1111
The paper provides the ﬁrst investigation on the outputs of rule-based argumentation systems1112
that use inconsistency-based attack relations. The study is general in the sense that it keeps1113
the attack relation unspeciﬁed. Thus, the system can be instantiated with any of the attack1114
relations that are used in existing systems. The results show that under naive semantics, the1115
systems return the literals that follow from all the options of the theory at hand. Stable and1116
preferred semantics either do not provide an added value with respect to naive semantics1117
or the attack relation of a system should be formalized in a very rigorous way in order to1118
avoid arbitrary results. Ideal semantics returns the free part of a theory, whereas the grounded1119
semantics returns a sub-part of the free part meaning that it may miss interesting conclusions.1120
Acknowledgements The authors are very grateful to the reviewers for their many insightful comments.1121
Appendix: Proofs1122
Proof of Property 2 LetT = (F,S,D)be a theory and x ∈ L. Letd = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉1123
be a derivation schema for x from T .1124
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(−→) Let us assume that there exist xi and x j such that xi = x j but i = j .1125
Clearly, we can further assume i < j without loss of generality. For each (xk, rk)1126
in d where k > j , x j ∈ Body(rk) is trivially equivalent to xi ∈ Body(rk)1127
hence Body(rk) ⊆ {x1, . . . , x j−1, x j+1, . . . , xk−1}. Therefore, 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (x j−1, r j−1),1128
(x j+1, r j+1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 is also a derivation schema, but it is a proper subsequence1129
of d , a contradiction arises. Now, let us assume that d fails to be focused. There1130
exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that xi /∈ Body(r j ) for every j > i . Consequently,1131
〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xi−1, ri−1), (xi+1, ri+1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 is also a derivation schema for x in1132
T , contradicting the minimality of d .1133
(←−) Let us assume that d fails to be minimal although d is focussed and the literals1134
x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct. As d is not minimal, there exists a proper subsequence d ′1135
of d which is a derivation schema for x in T . Let us write 〈(xk+1, rk+1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 for1136
the largest common ﬁnal subsequence of d and d ′. Now, k exists (and k > 0) because d ′ is1137
a proper subsequence of d . As d ′ is a derivation schema for xn and d ′ is a subsequence of1138
d and x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct, k < n ensues. Since d is focussed, xk ∈ Body(r j )1139
for some j > k. So, (x j , r j ) is in 〈(xk+1, rk+1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉. As d ′ is a derivation schema,1140
Body(r j ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk−1} (remember, d ′ is a subsequence of 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xk−1, rk−1),1141
(xk+1, rk+1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉). Hence, xk ∈ {x1, . . . , xk−1}. That is, x1, . . . , xn are not pairwise1142
distinct. ⊓⊔1143
Proof of Property 3 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.1144
• The inclusions CN(T ) ⊆ F ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ S ∪ D} ⊆ L follow trivially from1145
Deﬁnition 6.1146
• If T is ﬁnite, then F,S,D are ﬁnite. Thus, the set F ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ S ∪D} is ﬁnite.1147
From the ﬁrst item, CN(T ) is ﬁnite.1148
• For any x ∈ F , the sequence 〈(x, σ )〉 is a derivation schema for x from T . Thus,1149
x ∈ CN(T ) and this proves the inclusion F ⊆ CN(T ).1150
• ⊤ ∈ CN(T ) since ⊤ ∈ F and F ⊆ CN(T ).1151
• Assume that F = {⊤} and ∄r ∈ D such that Body(r) = {⊤}. Thus, since the body of1152
any other rule in T is assumed to be non-empty, no rule in S ∪D can be applied, hence1153
CN(T ) = {⊤}. Conversely, if CN(T ) = {⊤}, then F = {⊤} (since F ⊆ CN(T )) and1154
∄r ∈ D such that Body(r) = {⊤} (since each such rule is applicable when it exists).1155
• Let d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 be a derivation schema for x ∈ L from T . From Deﬁni-1156
tion 6, for each xi (i = 1, . . . , n), there exists a derivation schema from T for xi . Thus,1157
Seq(d) ⊆ CN(T ). ⊓⊔1158
Proof of Property 4 Let T = (F,S,D) and T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) be two theories such that1159
T ⊑ T ′. Let x ∈ CN(T ). So, there exists a derivation schema d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉1160
for x from T . Since T ⊑ T ′, Facts(d) ⊆ F ′ and Strict(d) ⊆ S ′ and Def(d) ⊆ D′.1161
Therefore, d is also a derivation schema for x from T ′. ⊓⊔1162
Proof of Property 5 The two properties follow trivially from the deﬁnition of option. ⊓⊔1163
Proof of Property 6 The inclusion POpt(T ) ⊆ Opt(T ) follows trivially from Deﬁnitions 91164
and 10.1165
Assume that CN(T ) is consistent. From Property 5, Opt(T ) = {T }. Since (F,S,∅) ⊑ T ,1166
POpt(T ) = {T }. Assume now that Opt(T ) ⊆ POpt(T ). Since Opt(T ) = ∅, for all1167
O ∈ Opt(T ) it holds that O ∈ POpt(T ). Thus, for all O ∈ Opt(T ), (F,S,∅) ⊑ O. It1168
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follows that (F,S,∅) ⊑ Free(T ).2 Assume that CN(T ) is inconsistent. Then, there exists1169
a minimal conﬂict2 C = (X, Y, Z) ⊑ T . Since (F,S,∅) ⊑ Free(T ), X = Y = ∅. But,1170
by assumption, the body of every defeasible rule is not empty. Thus, CN(C) = ∅. This1171
contradicts the fact that CN(C) is inconsistent. ⊓⊔1172
Proof of Property 7 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory.1173
Assume that CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent. Thus, there exists a preferred optionO such that1174
either (i) for all r ∈ D, CN((F,S, {r})) is inconsistent meaning that O = CN((F,S,∅)) or1175
(ii) there exists r ∈ D such that CN((F,S, {r})) is consistent thus (F,S,∅) ⊏ O. In both1176
cases, POpt(T ) = ∅. Assume now that CN((F,S,∅)) is inconsistent. SinceF and S should1177
be part of any preferred option and the set of consequences of a preferred option should be1178
consistent, then POpt(T ) = ∅.1179
Let r ∈ D and assume thatCN((F,S, {r})) is consistent. FromDeﬁnition 10, (F,S, {r}) is1180
either a preferred option (iff for all r ′ ∈ D such that r = r ′,CN((F,S, {r, r ′})) is inconsistent).1181
Or, there exists a preferred option O = (F,S, {r} ∪D′) where D′ ⊆ D\{r}. ⊓⊔1182
Proof of Property 8 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory and Free(T ) = (F,S,D′). From1183
the deﬁnition of Free(T ), Free(T ) ⊑ O for all O ∈ POpt(T ). From Property 4,1184
CN(Free(T )) ⊆ CN(O). Since CN(O) is consistent, then so is for CN(Free(T )). ⊓⊔1185
Proof of Property 9 Let (d, x) be a sub-argument of (d ′, x ′). Let xi ∈ Seq(d). There are1186
two possibilities:1187
• xi ∈ Facts(d), thus xi ∈ Facts(d ′) since Facts(d) ⊆ Facts(d ′). So, xi ∈1188
Seq(d ′).1189
• xi = Head(r) with r ∈ Strict(d)∪ Def(d); thus, r ∈ Strict(d ′)∪ Def(d ′) since1190
Strict(d) ⊆ Strict(d ′) and Def(d) ⊆ Def(d ′). So, xi ∈ Seq(d ′).1191
⊓⊔1192
Proof of Property 10 Let T = (F,S,D) be a theory. Since ⊤ ∈ F by Deﬁnition 4,1193
(〈⊤, σ 〉,⊤) ∈ Arg(T ) and thus Arg(T ) = ∅. ⊓⊔1194
Proof of Property 11 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system over a theory1195
T and Ext(H) its set of extensions under any extension-based semantics. Assume that1196
Ext(H) = ∅.1197
Let x ∈ Output(H). Thus, for all E ∈ Ext(H), ∃a ∈ E such that Conc(a) = x . It1198
follows that x ∈ Concs(Ei ), ∀Ei ∈ Ext(H) and hence x ∈
⋂
Ei∈Ext(H) Concs(Ei ).1199
Assume now that x ∈
⋂
Ei∈Ext(H) Concs(Ei ). Thus, ∀Ei , ∃ai ∈ Ei such that Conc(ai ) =1200
x . Consequently, x ∈ Output(H). ⊓⊔1201
Proof of Property 12 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1202
T . Let x ∈ Output(H). From Deﬁnition 17, ∃(d, x) ∈ Arg(T ). From Deﬁnition 12, d is1203
a derivation for x from T . Thus, x ∈ CN(T ). ⊓⊔1204
Proof of Property 16 Let R ∈ ℜp and let H = (Arg(T ),R) be a rule-based argumentation1205
system built over a theory T = (F,S,D). Since H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates, thus for all1206
E ∈ Extp(H),1207
2 LetT be a theory.Free(T ) is a sub-theory (X, Y, Z)ofT such that for allminimal conﬂictC = (X ′, Y ′, Z ′)
of T , it holds that X ∩ X ′ = ∅ and Y ∩Y ′ = ∅ and Z ∩ Z ′ = ∅. A minimal conflict of theory T is a sub-theory
C of T such that CN(C) is inconsistent and ∄C ′ ⊏ C such that CN(C ′) is inconsistent.
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• Concs(E) is consistent1208
• Concs(E) = CN(Concs(E),S,∅)1209
• For all a ∈ E , Sub(a) ⊆ E1210
• for all (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ), if Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E), then (d, x) ∈ E .1211
From Property 1, Exts(H) ⊆ Extp(H), then for all E ∈ Exts(H), E satisﬁes the above1212
four properties. Thus, H satisﬁes consistency, exhaustiveness and closure under both sub-1213
arguments and strict rules. Let us now show that it also satisﬁes strict precedence under1214
stable semantics. From Property 11, Output(H) =
⋂
Ei∈Extp(H) Concs(Ei ). Thus, for1215
all E ∈ Extp(H), Output(H) ⊆ Concs(E). Since H satisﬁes strict precedence under1216
preferred semantics, CN(F,S,∅) ⊆ Concs(E). Thus, the property is satisﬁed by every1217
stable extension. ⊓⊔1218
Proof of Proposition 1 Let T = (F,S,D). Let O,O′ ∈ Opt(T ) be such that CN(O) =1219
CN(O′). Let O = (X, Y, Z) and O′ = (X ′, Y ′, Z ′). For all x ∈ X , x ∈ CN(O) and thus1220
x ∈ X ′. The same holds for all x ′ ∈ X ′. Thus, X = X ′.1221
Let r ∈ Y ∪ Z . There are two cases: (i) Body(r)  CN(O). Consequently, Body(r) 1222
CN(O′). Thus, CN(O′ ⊕ r) is consistent. So, r ∈ Y ′ ∪ Z ′ (by deﬁnition of an option).1223
(ii) Body(r) ⊆ CN(O). Consequently, Body(r) ⊆ CN(O′). Thus, CN(O′ ⊕ r) is consis-1224
tent. So, r ∈ Y ′ ∪ Z ′ (by deﬁnition of an option). ⊓⊔1225
Proof of Proposition 2 If T is ﬁnite, then CN(T ) is ﬁnite (apply Property 3). Consequently,1226
Arg(T ) is ﬁnite. ⊓⊔1227
Proof of Proposition 3 Let T and T ′ be two theories such that T ⊑ T ′. Let (d, x) be an1228
argument deﬁned from T . All items in Deﬁnition 12 are independent from T except for d1229
being a derivation schema for x from T . Hence, for (d, x) to be an argument deﬁned from1230
T ′, it is enough that d be a derivation schema for x from T ′. Now, this is equivalent to1231
x ∈ CN(T ′). By Property 4, the latter follows from x ∈ CN(T ) (which is itself proved from1232
the fact that d is a derivation schema for x from T ). Thus, (d, x) is an argument deﬁned from1233
T ′. ⊓⊔1234
Proof of Proposition 4 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system such that R is1235
conﬂict-dependent. Let a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ) be such that (a, a) ∈ R. Since R is conﬂict-1236
dependent, Seq(d) is inconsistent. This is impossible since a is an argument (thus Seq(d)1237
should be consistent). ⊓⊔1238
Proof of Proposition 5 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1239
theory T such that CN(T ) is consistent and R is conﬂict-dependent. Assume that Arg(T )1240
is not conﬂict-free. Thus, there exist (d, x), (d ′, x ′) ∈ Arg(T ) such that (d, x)R(d ′, x ′).1241
Consequently,Seq(d)∪Seq(d ′) is inconsistent. Besides, fromProperty 3,Seq(d) ⊆ CN(T )1242
and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(T ). Thus, CN(T ) is inconsistent. Contradiction. ⊓⊔1243
Proof of Proposition 6 Let H be an argumentation system which satisﬁes consistency and1244
closure under sub-arguments. FromProposition 12,∀E ∈ Ext(H)Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)).1245
Since H satisﬁes consistency, ∀E ∈ Ext(H) Concs(E) is consistent. Thus, so is for1246
CN(Th(E)). ⊓⊔1247
Proof of Proposition 7 LetH = (Arg(T ),R)be an argumentation systembuilt over a theory1248
T = (F,S,D) such that ∅ ∈ Ext(H). Thus, Output(H) = ∅. Assume that H satisﬁes1249
strict precedence, then CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Output(H). Since ⊤ ∈ F and from Property 3, it1250
holds that F ⊆ CN((F,S,∅)), then ⊤ ∈ Output(H). ⊓⊔1251
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Proof of Proposition 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1252
theory T = (F,S,D). Assume that H satisﬁes consistency and strict precedence. From1253
Property 13, it holds that Output(H) is consistent. From strict precedence, CN((F,S,∅))1254
⊆ Output(H). Thus, CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent. ⊓⊔1255
Proof of Proposition 9 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such that1256
Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). Assume that H is closed under1257
sub-arguments and satisﬁes exhaustiveness. Let E ∈ Ext(H). From the monotonicity of1258
Arg, it holds that E ⊆ Arg(Th(E)). Let (d, x) ∈ Arg(Th(E)). From Proposition 12,1259
Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E). From the exhaustiveness postulate, (d, x) ∈ E . ⊓⊔1260
Proof of Proposition 10 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such that1261
Ext(H) = ∅ (under an extension-based semantics). Assume that H satisﬁes exhaustiveness1262
and strict precedence. Since H satisﬁes strict precedence, CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Output(H).1263
From Property 11, for all E ∈ Ext(H), CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Concs(E). Let (d, x) ∈1264
Arg((F,S,∅)). Thus, Seq(d) ⊆ CN((F,S,∅)). From exhaustiveness, (d, x) ∈ E . ⊓⊔1265
Proof of Proposition 11 In order to prove the compatibility of the postulates, it is sufﬁcient1266
to give an example of a system which satisﬁes all the ﬁve postulates. This system is ASPIC1267
as deﬁned in [17]. Proposition 1 in [17] shows that the system is closed under sub-arguments1268
under any Dung’s semantics. Proposition 8 in [17] shows that the system is closed under1269
strict rules under complete semantics, thus under stable semantics. Property 2 in [17] shows1270
that the system satisﬁes consistency under any Dung’s semantics. From Proposition 13, the1271
system satisﬁes exhaustiveness. Let us now show that the system satisﬁes strict precedence.1272
This follows from the deﬁnition of attack relation (Deﬁnition 16 in [17]) according to which1273
a strict argument cannot be attacked. Thus, it belongs to any stable extension. ⊓⊔1274
Proof of Proposition 12 Let H be an argumentation system such that Ext(H) = ∅ where1275
Ext(H) is its set of extensions under an extension-based semantics. Assume thatH is closed1276
under sub-arguments and let E ∈ Ext(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z).1277
• Let x ∈ Concs(E). Thus, ∃(d, x) ∈ E where d is a derivation for x from (Facts(d),1278
Strict(d), Def(d)). From Property 3, x ∈ Facts(d) (thus x ∈ X ), or x = Head(r)1279
where r ∈ Strict(d) (thus r ∈ Y ) or x ∈ Def(d) (thus x ∈ Z ).1280
Assume now that x ∈ X . Thus, ∃(d, y) ∈ E such that x ∈ Facts(d). Besides,1281
(〈(x, σ )〉, x) is a sub-argument of (d, y). Since H is closed under sub-arguments,1282
(〈(x, σ )〉, x) ∈ E , and thus, x ∈ Concs(E).1283
Let r ∈ Y ∪ Z . Thus, ∃(d, x) ∈ E such that r ∈ Strict(d) ∪ Def(d). Let1284
d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xi , r), (xi+1, ri+1) . . . , (xn = x, rn)〉 with xi = Head(r). Thus,1285
there exists a sub-sequence d ′ of d which is a derivation for xi . This derivation is minimal1286
(for set inclusion since (d, x) is an argument). Thus, (d ′, xi ) is an argument. Moreover,1287
it is a sub-argument of (d, x). Since H is closed under sub-arguments, (d ′, xi ) ∈ E .1288
Consequently, xi ∈ Concs(E). Thus, Concs(E) = X ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ Y ∪ Z}.1289
• From the deﬁnitions of the two functions Concs and Th, it follows that Concs(E) ⊆1290
CN(Th(E)). From Property 3, CN(Th(E)) ⊆ X ∪ {Head(r) | r ∈ Y ∪ Z}. From above,1291
CN(Th(E)) ⊆ Concs(E).1292
• Assume now that a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(Th(E)). For all xi ∈ Seq(d), xi ∈ CN(Th(E)).1293
Since H is closed under sub-arguments, CN(Th(E)) = Concs(E). Then, xi ∈1294
Concs(E). Thus, Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E).1295
⊓⊔1296
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Proof of Proposition 13 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1297
theory T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under1298
sub-arguments. Assume that H violates exhaustiveness. Thus, there exists E ∈ Extn(H)1299
and there exists a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ) such that Seq(d) ⊆ Concs(E) but (d, x) /∈ E . So,1300
∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E such that aRb or bRa. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d)∪ Seq(d ′)1301
is inconsistent. Thus, ∃y ∈ Seq(d) such that ¬y ∈ d ′. But, y,¬y ∈ CN(Th(E)). Since H1302
is closed under sub-arguments, CN(Th(E)) = Concs(E). Thus, y,¬y ∈ Concs(E). This1303
contradicts the fact that H satisﬁes consistency. ⊓⊔1304
Proof of Proposition 14 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1305
theory T such thatR is conﬂict-dependent andH satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1306
arguments. From Proposition 13, H satisﬁes exhaustiveness. From Proposition 9, it follows1307
that for all E ∈ Extn(H), E = Arg(Th(E)). ⊓⊔1308
Proof of Proposition 15 The proof is similar to that of Propositions 13 and 14. ⊓⊔1309
Proof of Theorem 1 Let T be a theory and d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 a consistent sequence1310
from T .1311
(−→) Assume that (d, x) is an argument from T . d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 yields1312
x = xn (Deﬁnition 12). Assume that d is not focused. Let d∗ be obtained from d by deleting1313
all repeated pairs. Since d is not focused, d∗ is not minimal. Therefore, there exists (xk, rk) in1314
d∗ (hence in d) such that depriving d∗ from (xk, rk) still gives a derivation of x from T . Since1315
d∗ contains no repeated pair, for every (xi , ri ) in d∗, if i = k then either xi = xk or ri = rk .1316
For rk = σ , the former implies the latter hence ri = rk whenever i = k. Thus, depriving1317
d∗ from (xk, rk) gives a derivation d ′ of x from T such that Facts(d ′) ⊆ Facts(d) and1318
Strict(d ′) ⊆ Strict(d) and Def(d ′) ⊆ Def(d), with one of the latter two inclusions1319
being strict. That is, there exists T ′ ⊏ (Facts(d),Strict(d),Def(d)) such that x ∈1320
CN(T ′), thereby contradictingDeﬁnition 12. The remaining case is rk = σ . Since d∗ contains1321
no repeated pair, no (xi , ri ) in d∗ is (xk, σ ) except for i = k and it follows that d∗ deprived1322
from (xk, rk) gives a derivation d ′ of x from T such that Facts(d ′) ⊂ Facts(d) while1323
Strict(d ′) ⊆ Strict(d) and Def(d ′) ⊆ Def(d). As above, a contradiction arises.1324
(←−) Assume that d is a focused derivation schema from T such that xn = x . By1325
the deﬁnitions, x ∈ L and d is a derivation schema for x from T . Due to the hypoth-1326
esis in the statement of the theorem, Seq(d) is consistent. Assume that there exists1327
T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) ⊏ (Facts(d),Strict(d),Def(d)) such that x ∈ CN(T ′). That is, there1328
exists a derivation d ′ = 〈(x ′1, r ′1), . . . , (x ′m, r ′m)〉 for some m < n such that Facts(d ′) = F ′1329
and Strict(d ′) = S ′ and Def(d ′) = D′. Let d∗ be a minimal derivation schema for x from1330
T obtained from d by deleting all repeated pairs. Accordingly,Facts(d∗) = Facts(d) and1331
Strict(d∗) = Strict(d) and Def(d∗) = Def(d). Since Strict(d ′) ⊆ Strict(d)1332
and Def(d ′) ⊆ Def(d), if (x ′i , r ′i ) is in d ′ with r ′i = σ then there exists k such that (xk, rk)1333
is in d∗ where rk = r ′i (also, xk = x ′i because x ′i = Head(r ′i ) = Head(rk) = xk). Similarly,1334
since Facts(d ′) ⊆ Facts(d), if (x ′i , r ′i ) is in d ′ with r ′i = σ then there exists k such that1335
(xk, rk) is in d∗ where x ′i = xk and rk = r ′i = σ . That is, d ′ is a proper subsequence of a1336
reordering of d∗, thereby contradicting the minimality of d∗.1337
Indeed, let us show that no initial proper fragment of a reordering d∗ι of d∗ is a1338
minimal derivation of x . Assume a reordering d∗ι = 〈(x∗ι1, r∗ι1), . . . , (x∗ιp, r∗ιp)〉 of d∗ =1339
〈(x∗1 , r
∗
1 ), . . . , (x
∗
p, r
∗
p)〉 such that dι = 〈(x∗ι1, r∗ι1), . . . , (x∗ιq , r∗ιq)〉 is a minimal derivation of1340
x from T for some q < p. Let j be the greatest index from 1 . . . p such that x∗j is in Seq(d∗)1341
but not in Seq(dι) (clearly, j < p). Since d∗ is minimal, there must exist h > j such that1342
x∗j ∈ Body(r
∗
h ) (otherwise d∗ deprived of (x∗j , r∗j ) would give a proper subsequence also1343
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being a derivation of x). By Property 2, x∗h = x∗i for i = h. Hence,Head(r∗i ) = x∗h for i = h.1344
Together with x∗j /∈ Seq(dι) and x∗j ∈ Body(r∗h ), this entails x∗h /∈ Seq(dι). Therefore, j is1345
not the greatest index such that x∗j is in Seq(d∗) but not in Seq(dι). ⊓⊔1346
Lemma 1 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =1347
(F,S,D) such that CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent and R is conflict-dependent and privileges1348
strict arguments. For all a ∈ Arg(Free(T )), b ∈ Arg(T ), if aRb or bRa, then ∃a′ ∈1349
Sub(a) such that a′ is strict and a′Rb.1350
Proof LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F,S,D)1351
such that CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent. Assume that R is conﬂict-dependent and privileges1352
strict arguments.1353
Assume that ∃a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(Free(T )) and ∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ Arg(T ) such that1354
bRa or bRa. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent and thus1355
CN(Th({a}))∪CN(Th({b})) is inconsistent (since from Property 3, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(Th({a}))1356
and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th({b}))).1357
Let Th({a}) = (X, Y, Z) and Th({b}) = (X ′, Y ′, Z ′). Let us show that CN((F,S, Z ′)) is1358
inconsistent. Assume that CN((F,S, Z ′)) is consistent. Thus, there exists a preferred option1359
O ∈ POpt(T ) such that (F,S, Z ′) ⊑ O. Since (X, Y, Z) ⊑ Free(T ) and Free(T ) ⊑ O,1360
(F,S, Z ∪ Z ′) ⊑ O. From Property 4, CN((F,S, Z ∪ Z ′)) ⊆ CN(O). Thus, CN(O) is1361
inconsistent. This contradicts the fact that O is an option.1362
Let Z∗ be the smallest (for set inclusion) subset of Z ′ such that CN((F,S, Z∗)) is incon-1363
sistent. Thus, for all r ∈ Z∗, CN((F,S, Z∗\{r})) is consistent. It follows that for all r ∈ Z∗,1364
there exists a preferred option O ∈ POpt(T ) such that (F,S, Z ∪ Z∗\{r}) ⊑ O by Prop-1365
erty 8.1366
Assume that for every strict a′′ ∈ Sub(a), Seq(d ′′) ∪ Seq(d ′) is consistent. How-1367
ever, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent (since aRb or bRa while R is conﬂict-dependent).1368
Hence, Head(Def(d)) ∪ Head(Def(d ′)) is inconsistent, say y ∈ Head(Def(d)) and1369
¬y ∈ Head(Def(d ′)). Should no such y be inF∪Head(S), then there would be a preferred1370
option O = (F, S, DO ) with ¬y ∈ Head(DO ). A contradiction arises, because a = (d, x)1371
being in Arg(Free(T )) means that Def(d) is a subset of DO for every preferred option1372
O = (F, S, DO ).1373
That is, there exists a′′ = (d ′′, x ′′) ∈ Sub(a) such that a′′ is strict and Seq(d ′′)∪Seq(d ′)1374
is inconsistent. Since R privileges strict arguments, a′′Rb. ⊓⊔1375
Proof of Theorem 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1376
T = (F,S,D) such that CN((F,S,∅)) is consistent. Assume that R is conﬂict-dependent1377
and privileges strict arguments.1378
We show ﬁrst that Arg(Free(T )) is conﬂict-free. From Property 8, CN(Free(T )) is1379
consistent. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, from Proposition 5, Arg(Free(T )) is conﬂict-1380
free.1381
Let us now show that Arg(Free(T )) defends its elements. Assume that ∃a = (d, x) ∈1382
Arg(Free(T )) and ∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ Arg(T ) such that bRa. From Lemma 1, there exists1383
a′ = (d ′′, x ′′) ∈ Sub(a) such that a′ is strict, hence a ∈ Arg(Free(T )), and a′Rb. ⊓⊔1384
Proof of Theorem 3 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1385
T = (F,S,D) such that Ext(H) = ∅. Assume that H satisﬁes strict precedence and1386
closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments. Let E ∈ Ext(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z).1387
Since X ⊆ F and Y ⊆ S, (X, Y, Z) ⊑ (F,S, Z). From Property 4, CN((X, Y, Z)) ⊆1388
CN((F,S, Z)).1389
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Let us now show that CN((F,S, Z)) ⊆ CN((X, Y, Z)). Since H satisﬁes strict prece-1390
dence, CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Output(H). From Property 11, Output(H) ⊆ Concs(E).1391
SinceH is closed under sub-arguments, Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)) by Proposition 12. Hence,1392
CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ CN((X, Y, Z)). Furthermore, from Property 3, F ⊆ CN((F,S,∅)). Thus,1393
X = F , i.e., Th(E) = (F, Y, Z). Let x ∈ CN((F,S, Z)). Then, there exists a derivation1394
schema1395
d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉1396
for x from (F,S, Z). There are two cases:1397
• For any i = 1, . . . , n, ri ∈ {σ } ∪ Y ∪ Z . Hence, d is also a derivation schema for x from1398
(F, Y, Z). Thus, x ∈ CN((F, Y, Z)).1399
• There exists 1 < i ≤ n such that ri ∈ S\Y (note that the two theories (F, Y, Z) and1400
(F,S, Z) differ only on S\Y ). Let i be the ﬁrst step where an element of S\Y is used1401
in the derivation d . Note also that i > 1 since strict rules have non-empty bodies. Thus,1402
for any j < i , r j ∈ {σ } ∪ Y ∪ Z and 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (x j , r j )〉 is a derivation schema of x j1403
from (F, Y, Z). Thus, x j ∈ CN((F, Y, Z)). Furthermore,Body(ri ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xi−1}, so1404
Body(ri ) ⊆ CN((F, Y, Z)). Since Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)), Body(ri ) ⊆ Concs(E).1405
Since H is closed under strict rules, Head(ri ) ∈ Concs(E) = CN((F, Y, Z)), i.e., xi ∈1406
CN((F, Y, Z)). We repeat the same reasoning for showing that each xi ∈ CN((F, Y, Z))1407
and conclude that x ∈ CN((F, Y, Z)).1408
⊓⊔1409
Proof of Theorem 4 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1410
T = (F,S,D) such that H satisﬁes strict precedence, and closure under both strict rules1411
and sub-arguments.1412
Let E ∈ Ext(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z). From Theorem 3 and Proposition 12, it holds1413
that1414
CN(Th(E)) = CN((F,S, Z)) = Concs(E). (*)14151416
Let O = (F,S, Z ∪ Z ′) where Z ′ = {r | r ∈ D\Z and Body(r)  CN(Th(E))}. Since1417
(F,S, Z) ⊑ O, then from Property 4 and (*), Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O). Let us now show that1418
CN(O) ⊆ Concs(E). Let x ∈ CN((F,S, Z ∪ Z ′)). Then, there exists a derivation schema1419
d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉1420
for x from (F,S, Z ∪ Z ′). There are two cases:1421
• For any i = 1, . . . , n, ri ∈ {σ } ∪ S ∪ Z . Hence, d is also a derivation schema for x from1422
(F,S, Z). Thus, x ∈ CN((F,S, Z)), and from (1), x ∈ Concs(E).1423
• Assume that there exists 1 < i ≤ n such that ri ∈ Z ′ (note that the two theories (F,S, Z)1424
and (F,S, Z ∪ Z ′) differ only on Z ′). Let i be the ﬁrst step where an element of Z ′ is1425
used in the derivation d . Since the bodies of defeasible rules are not empty, i > 1. It1426
follows that for any j < i , ri ∈ {σ } ∪ S ∪ Z , thus 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (x j , r j )〉 is a derivation1427
schema of x j from (F,S, Z). Thus, x j ∈ CN((F,S, Z)). Furthermore, by Deﬁnition 6,1428
Body(ri ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xi−1}. Then, Body(ri ) ⊆ CN((F,S, Z)). This contradicts the fact1429
that ri ∈ Z ′ and thus such ri does not exist.1430
⊓⊔1431
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Proof of Theorem 5 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1432
T = (F,S,D) such that R is conﬂict-dependent. Assume that for all E ∈ Extn(H),1433
Arg((F,S,∅)) ⊆ E . Assume now that ∃a ∈ Arg((F,S,∅)) and ∃b ∈ Arg(T ) such1434
that aRb or bRa. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, (b, b) /∈ R (cf. Proposition 4). Thus,1435
∃E ∈ Extn(H) such that b ∈ E . Consequently, a, b ∈ E , this contradicts the fact that E is1436
conﬂict-free (since it is a naive extension).1437
Assume now that for all a ∈ Arg((F,S,∅)), ∄b ∈ Arg(T ) such that aRb or bRa. This1438
means that arguments of Arg((F,S,∅)) are not attacked. Thus, they belong to every naive1439
extension. ⊓⊔1440
Proof of Theorem 6 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1441
T = (F,S,D) such that R is conﬂict-dependent. Assume that ∃a, b ∈ Arg(T ) such that1442
a ∈ Arg((F,S,∅)) and Conc(a) = ¬Conc(b). Thus, (b, b) /∈ R and ∃E ∈ Extn(H)1443
such that b ∈ E . If H satisﬁes strict precedence, then Conc(a) ∈ Concs(E) meaning that1444
Concs(E) is inconsistent. Thus, H violates consistency. If H satisﬁes consistency, then1445
Conc(a) /∈ Concs(E) meaning that H violates strict precedence. ⊓⊔1446
Proof of Theorem 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1447
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1448
arguments. Let E, E ′ ∈ Extn(H) such that Concs(E ′) ⊆ Concs(E).1449
Assume that∃a = (d, x) ∈ E\E ′. Thus,∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E ′ such thataRb or bRa. SinceR1450
is conﬂict-dependent,Seq(d)∪Seq(d ′) is inconsistent.ButH is closedunder sub-arguments.1451
Thus, Proposition 12 gives Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)) and Concs(E ′) = CN(Th(E ′)).1452
Besides, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(Th(E)) and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E ′)) using Propositions 12 and 14.1453
Since CN(Th(E ′)) ⊆ CN(Th(E)), Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E)). Thus, CN(Th(E)) is1454
inconsistent. This contradicts the fact that H satisﬁes consistency.1455
The same reasoning holds for a = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E ′\E . ⊓⊔1456
Proof of Theorem 8 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1457
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1458
arguments. Let E ∈ Extn(H).1459
From Proposition 6, CN(Th(E)) is consistent. Thus, ∃O ∈ Opt(T ) such that Th(E) ⊑1460
O. From Property 4, CN(Th(E)) ⊆ CN(O). Since H is closed under sub-arguments,1461
CN(Th(E)) = Concs(E) by Proposition 12. Thus, Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O). Assume now1462
that ∃x ∈ CN(O)\Concs(E). Then, there exists a minimal derivation d for x from O. From1463
Property 3, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(O). Since CN(O) is consistent, (d, x) is an argument. In addition1464
(d, x) /∈ E . Then, ∃(d ′, x ′) ∈ E such that (d, x)R(d ′, x ′) or (d ′, x ′)R(d, x). Since R is1465
conﬂict-dependent, then Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent. But, Seq(d ′) ⊆ Concs(E).1466
So, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(O). This contradicts the fact that O is an option. So,1467
CN(O) ⊆ Concs(E).1468
Since both Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O) and CN(O) ⊆ Concs(E) have now been proved, the1469
required CN(O) = Concs(E) follows.1470
Let us now show that O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). Assume that ∃O′ ∈ Opt(T ) such that1471
CN(O) ⊆ CN(O′). Thus, ∃x ∈ CN(O′) and x /∈ CN(O). Thus, there exists a minimal deriva-1472
tion d for x from O′. Since CN(O′) is consistent and Seq(d) ⊆ CN(O′) (from Property 3),1473
(d, x) is an argument. In addition (d, x) /∈ E (since x /∈ CN(O)). Then, ∃(d ′, x ′) ∈ E such1474
that (d, x)R(d ′, x ′) or (d ′, x ′)R(d, x). Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d)∪ Seq(d ′) is1475
inconsistent. But, Seq(d ′) ⊆ Concs(E). So, Seq(d)∪Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(O′). This contradicts1476
the fact that O′ is an option.1477
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From Proposition 1, it follows that for all O,O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )), if CN(O) = CN(O′) =1478
Concs(E), then O = O′. ⊓⊔1479
Proof of Theorem 9 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1480
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1481
arguments.1482
• LetE, E ′ ∈ Extn(H). FromTheorem8,∃O,O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such thatConcs(E) =1483
CN(O) and Concs(E ′) = CN(O′). If O = O′, then Concs(E) = Concs(E ′). From1484
Theorem 7, E = E ′.1485
• Let E ∈ Extn(H) and O = Option(E). Thus, Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).1486
From Proposition 3, Arg(Th(E)) ⊆ Arg(O). From Proposition 14, Arg(Th(E)) = E .1487
Thus, E ⊆ Arg(O). Assume now that ∃a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(O) and a /∈ E . Thus,1488
∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E and aRb or bRa. SinceR is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d)∪Seq(d ′) is1489
inconsistent. Besides, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(O) and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E)). Since H is closed1490
under sub-arguments, CN(Th(E)) = CN(O). Thus, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(O). This1491
contradicts the fact that O is an option.1492
⊓⊔1493
Proof of Theorem 10 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1494
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1495
arguments.1496
• Let O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). Thus, CN(O) is consistent. From Proposition 5, since R is1497
conﬂict-dependent, Arg(O) is conﬂict-free. Assume now that Arg(O) /∈ Extn(H).1498
Thus, ∃a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ) such that a /∈ Arg(O) and Arg(O) ∪ {a} is conﬂict-1499
free. Consequently, ∃E ∈ Extn(H) such that Arg(O) ∪ {a} ⊆ E . It follows that1500
Concs(Arg(O) ∪ {a}) ⊆ Concs(E). Since CN(O) is consistent, Concs(Arg(O)) =1501
CN(O). Thus, CN(O) ∪ {x} ⊆ Concs(E). From Theorem 8, ∃O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such1502
that Concs(E) = CN(O′). Then, CN(O) ∪ {x} ⊆ CN(O′). This contradicts the fact that1503
O is a maximal option.1504
• Let O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). By deﬁnition of Th, Th(Arg(O)) ⊑ O. From Property 4,1505
CN(Th(Arg(O))) ⊆ CN(O). Besides, from ﬁrst item, Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H). From The-1506
orem 8, ∃O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such that Th(Arg(O)) ⊑ O′ and Concs(Arg(O)) =1507
CN(O′). SinceH is closed under sub-arguments,CN(Th(Arg(O))) = Concs(Arg(O)).1508
Consequently, CN(O′) ⊆ CN(O). From Proposition 1, O = O′.1509
• Let O,O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )). Assume that Arg(O) = Arg(O′).1510
It follows that Option(Arg(O)) = Option(Arg(O′)). From item 2, it follows that1511
O = O′.1512
⊓⊔1513
Proof of Theorem 11 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a the-1514
ory T = (F,S,D) such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency, strict1515
precedence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments.1516
Let us show that Max(Opt(T )) ⊆ Max(POpt(T )). Let O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). From1517
(item 1) of Theorem 10, Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H). From Theorem 8, Concs(Arg(O)) =1518
CN(Option(Arg(O))). From Corollary 1, Option(Arg(O)) = O. Hence, Concs1519
(Arg(O)) = CN(O). From Theorem 4, there exists O′ = (F,S, Z) such that1520
Z =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈Arg(O)
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ ∪ {r | r ∈ D and Body(r)  CN (Th (Arg(O)))}1521
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and Concs(Arg(O)) = CN(O′). Since Concs(Arg(O)) = CN(O) and using Proposition1522
12, Concs(Arg(O)) = CN(Th(Arg(O))), then CN(Th(Arg(O))) = CN(O) and we get1523
Z =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈Arg(O)
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ ∪ {r | r ∈ D and Body(r)  CN(O)}1524
and CN(O) = CN(O′). From Proposition 1, it follows that O = O′. Furthermore, O ∈1525
Max(Opt(T )) and is maximal (for set inclusion) up to consistency and contains the strict1526
part of T , then O ∈ Max(POpt(T )).1527
Let us now show that Max(POpt(T )) ⊆ Max(Opt(T )). Let O ∈ Max(POpt(T )). By1528
deﬁnition of preferred option, CN(O) is consistent. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Arg(O)1529
is conﬂict-free by Proposition 5. Assume now that Arg(O) /∈ Extn(H). Thus, ∃a ∈1530
Arg(T )\Arg(O) such that Arg(O) ∪ {a} is conﬂict-free. Consequently, ∃E ∈ Extn(H)1531
such that Arg(O) ∪ {a} ⊆ E . Thus, Concs(Arg(O) ∪ {a}) ⊆ Concs(E). Since CN(O) is1532
consistent,Concs(Arg(O)) = CN(O). Thus,CN(O)∪{Conc(a)} ⊆ Concs(E). FromThe-1533
orem 8, ∃O′ ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such that Concs(E) = CN(O′). Then, CN(O)∪{Conc(a)} ⊆1534
CN(O′). This means that O′ ∈ POpt(T ) (since it contains all consequences of the strict1535
part of T ). This contradicts the fact that O is a maximal preferred option. Consequently,1536
Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H). From Theorem 8, O ∈ Max(Opt(T )). ⊓⊔1537
Proof of Theorem 12 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1538
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency and closure under sub-1539
arguments. From Property 11, Output(H) =
⋂
Ei∈Extn(H)
Concs(Ei ). From Theorem 8, for1540
allEi ∈ Extn(H), there exists a uniqueOi ∈ Max(Opt(T )) such thatConcs(Ei ) = CN(Oi ).1541
Also, Corollary 1 guarantees that Max(Opt(T )) does not have any additional elements that1542
do not have a mapping in Extn(H). Thus,1543
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈Max(Opt(T ))
CN(Oi ).1544
⊓⊔1545
Lemma 2 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T =1546
(F,S,D) such that R is conflict-dependent and H satisfies the five postulates. For any1547
E ∈ Exts(H), it holds that (F,S, Z) ∈ Max(POpt(T )) whenever1548
Z =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ ∪ {r | r ∈ D and Body(r)  CN(Th(E))} .1549
Proof Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory T such that1550
R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. Let E ∈ Exts(H) and Th(E) =1551
(X, Y, Z). Let O = (F,S, Z ∪ Z ′) where Z ′ = {r | r ∈ D\Z and Body(r)  CN(Th(E))}.1552
Clearly, Th(E) ⊑ O. From Theorem 4, Concs(E) = CN(O). Since H satisﬁes consistency,1553
then Concs(E) is consistent, and thus, CN(O) is consistent as well. Since (F,S,∅) ⊑ O1554
and CN(O) is consistent, from Property 7, ∃O′ ∈ POpt(T ) such that O ⊑ O′. From Propo-1555
sition 3, Arg(Th(E)) ⊆ Arg(O) ⊆ Arg(O′). From Proposition 9, E = Arg(Th(E)).1556
Hence, E ⊆ Arg(O) ⊆ Arg(O′). Since R is conﬂict-dependent, CN(O) and CN(O′) are1557
consistent, then from Proposition 5 Arg(O) and Arg(O′) are both conﬂict-free. From Prop-1558
erty 1, E ∈ Extn(H). Then, E is maximal (for set inclusion) among conﬂict-free sets.1559
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Thus, E = Arg(O) = Arg(O′). From consistency of CN(O) and CN(O′), it follows that1560
Concs(Arg(O)) = CN(O) and Concs(Arg(O′)) = CN(O′). Then, CN(O) = CN(O′) and1561
O ∈ POpt(T ).1562
Let us now show that O ∈ Max(POpt(T )). Assume that ∃O′ ∈ POpt(T ) such that1563
CN(O) ⊆ CN(O′). Since Concs(E) = CN(O), Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O′). Let x ∈ CN(O′) and1564
x /∈ Concs(E). SinceCN(O′) is consistent, there exists an argument (d, x) ∈ Arg(O′), i.e.,d1565
is a derivation of x fromO′. Clearly, (d, x) /∈ E . Thus, ∃(d ′, x ′) ∈ E such that (d ′, x ′)R(d, x).1566
SinceR is conﬂict-dependent,Seq(d)∪Seq(d ′) is inconsistent. But,Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E))1567
and Seq(d) ⊆ CN(O′). Proposition 13 gives CN(Th(E)) = Concs(E). Then, CN(Th(E)) ⊆1568
CN(O′). Finally, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(O′). This contradicts the fact that CN(O′) is1569
consistent. ⊓⊔1570
Proof of Theorem 13 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1571
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency, exhaustiveness, strict prece-1572
dence and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments. Assume that Exts(H) = ∅.1573
Let E ∈ Exts(H) and Th(E) = (X, Y, Z). From Lemma 2, the option O = (F,S, Z ′) ∈1574
Max(POpt(T )) with Z ′ = Z ∪ {r | r ∈ D\Z and Body(r)  CN(Th(E))}. Since X ⊆ F ,1575
Y ⊆ S and Z ⊆ Z ′, Th(E) ⊑ O. From Theorem 4, Concs(E) = CN(O).1576
Let us show that E has a unique corresponding preferred maximal option. Assume that1577
∃O1,O2 ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O1, Concs(E) = CN(O1), Th(E) ⊑ O21578
and Concs(E) = CN(O2). Obviously, CN(O1) = CN(O2). However, O1,O2 ∈ POpt(T )1579
according to Property 6 hence Proposition 1 gives O1 = O2.1580
Let us now show that E = Arg(O). SinceTh(E) ⊑ O, fromProposition 3,Arg(Th(E)) ⊆1581
Arg(O). From Proposition 15, E ⊆ Arg(O). Assume now that ∃a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(O) such1582
that a /∈ E . Thus, ∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E and bRa. Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d) ∪1583
Seq(d ′) is inconsistent. Besides, Seq(d) ⊆ CN(O) and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E)). Since H1584
is closed under sub-arguments, CN(Th(E)) = CN(O) by Proposition 12. Thus, Seq(d) ∪1585
Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(O). This contradicts the fact that O is an option. ⊓⊔1586
Proof of Theorem 14 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a the-1587
ory T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes consistency, strict precedence1588
and closure under both strict rules and sub-arguments. Assume that Exts(H) = ∅. Let1589
E, E ′ ∈ Exts(H). From Theorem 13, ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Concs(E) = CN(O)1590
and ∃O′ ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Concs(E ′) = CN(O′). If O = O′, then Concs(E) =1591
Concs(E ′). Assume that ∃a = (d, x) ∈ E\E ′. Thus, ∃b = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E ′ such that bRa.1592
Since R is conﬂict-dependent, Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) is inconsistent. But H is closed under1593
sub-arguments. Thus, Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)) and Concs(E ′) = CN(Th(E ′)). Besides,1594
Seq(d) ⊆ CN(Th(E)) and Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E ′)). Since CN(Th(E ′)) = CN(Th(E)),1595
Seq(d) ∪ Seq(d ′) ⊆ CN(Th(E)). Thus, CN(Th(E)) is inconsistent. This contradicts the1596
fact that H satisﬁes consistency. The same reasoning holds for a = (d ′, x ′) ∈ E ′\E . ⊓⊔1597
Proof of Theorem 15 Any argumentation system H = (Arg(T ),R) that satisﬁes strict1598
precedence should haveF as plausible conclusions, i.e.,F ⊆ CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Output(H).1599
Since ⊤ ∈ F , then Output(H) = ∅. However, since R ∈ ℜs1 , Exts(H) = ∅. Thus,1600
Output(H) = ∅. ⊓⊔1601
Proof of Theorem 16 Let H = (Arg(T ), R) be an argumentation system over a theory1602
T such that R ∈ ℜs2 . Let O ∈ Max(POpt(T )). Since |Exts(H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|,1603
from Theorems 13 and 14, ∃E ∈ Exts(H) such that E = Arg(O), hence Arg(O) ∈1604
Exts(H). ⊓⊔1605
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Proof of Theorem 17 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1606
theory T such that R ∈ ℜs2. From Corollary 5, Exts(H) = Extss(H). Assume that1607
∃E ∈ Extp(H)\Exts(H). From Theorem 22, there exists O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that1608
Th(E) ⊑ O. Since |Exts(H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|, fromTheorem 16,Arg(O) ∈ Exts(H).1609
From Theorems 13 and 14, O = Option(Arg(O)). From Theorem 24, E = Arg(O). ⊓⊔1610
Proof of Theorem 18 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system such thatR ∈ ℜs2 .1611
IfH satisﬁes all the postulates under naive semantics, then fromCorollary 1 and Theorem 11,1612
there is a bijection between Extn(H) and Max(POpt(T )). From Theorems 13 and 16,1613
|Exts(H)| = |Max(POpt(T ))|. Since every stable extension is a naive one, Extn(H) =1614
Exts(H). ⊓⊔1615
Proof of Theorem 19 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1616
T such that R ∈ ℜs2 . From Property 11,1617
Output(H) =
⋂
Ei∈Exts (H)
Concs(Ei ).1618
From Theorems 13 and 14, for all Ei ∈ Exts(H), there exists a uniqueOi ∈ Max(POpt(T ))1619
such that Concs(Ei ) = CN(Oi ). Thus,1620
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈Max(Opt(T ))
CN(Oi ).1621
⊓⊔1622
Proof of Theorem 20 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1623
T such that R ∈ ℜs3 . From Property 11,1624
Output(H) =
⋂
Ei∈Exts (H)
Concs(Ei ).1625
From Theorem 13, for all Ei ∈ Exts(H), there exists a unique Oi ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such1626
that Concs(Ei ) = CN(Oi ). Since R ∈ ℜs3 , |Exts(H)| < |Max(POpt(T ))|. Thus,1627
Output(H) =
⋂
Oi∈X
CN(Oi )1628
with X = {Oi ∈ Max(POpt(T )) | Ei = Arg(Oi ) ∈ Exts(H)}. ⊓⊔1629
Proof of Theorem 21 Let H be an argumentation system built over a theory T = (F,S,D)1630
such that H satisﬁes the strict precedence postulate, i.e., F ⊆ Output(H). Since ⊤ ∈ F ,1631
Output(H) = ∅. Hence, Extp(H) = {∅}. ⊓⊔1632
Proof of Theorem 22 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1633
T such thatR is conﬂict-dependent andH satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. Let E ∈ Extp(H) and1634
Th(E) = (X, Y, Z). From Theorem 4, Concs(E) = CN(O) where O = (F,S, Z ∪ Z ′) and1635
Z ′ ⊆ D\Z . Clearly Th(E) ⊑ O. From consistency, Concs(E) is consistent. Then, CN(O)1636
is consistent as well. Then, there exists O′ ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that O ⊑ O′. Therefore,1637
CN(O) ⊆ CN(O′). Thus, Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O′). ⊓⊔1638
Proof of Theorem 23 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a the-1639
ory T = (F,S,D) such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates1640
under preferred semantics. Since Exts(H) ⊆ Extp(H), H satisﬁes the postulates under1641
stable semantics. Consequently, from Theorem 15, Exts(H) = ∅. Let E ∈ Exts(H). From1642
Theorem 13, ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that E = Arg(O). ⊓⊔1643
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Proof of Theorem 24 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1644
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes exhaustiveness and closure under sub-1645
arguments. Let E, E ′ ∈ Extp(H) and O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and1646
Th(E ′) ⊑ O. We show that E ∪ E ′ is a preferred extension (which contradicts the fact that E1647
and E ′ are preferred extensions).1648
FromProposition 3,Arg(Th(E)) ⊆ Arg(O) andArg(Th(E ′)) ⊆ Arg(O). SinceH satis-1649
ﬁes exhaustiveness and closure under sub-arguments, from Proposition 9, Arg(Th(E)) = E1650
and Arg(Th(E ′)) = E ′. Thus, E ∪ E ′ ⊆ Arg(O). Since CN(O) is consistent and R is1651
conﬂict-dependent, from Proposition 5 Arg(O) is conﬂict-free. Consequently, E ∪ E ′ is also1652
conﬂict-free. Moreover, E ∪ E ′ defends its elements since E and E ′ are preferred extensions.1653
Thus, E ∪ E ′ is an admissible set. Due to E and E ′ being preferred extensions, it follows that1654
E ∪ E ′ = E = E ′. ⊓⊔1655
Proof of Theorem 25 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1656
T = (F,S,D) such that R is conﬂict-dependent and privileges strict a guments, and H1657
satisﬁes consistency, exhaustiveness, strict precedence and closure under sub-arguments.1658
From consistency and strict precedence, it follows by Proposition 8 that CN((F,S,∅)) is1659
consistent.1660
The conclusion of the theorem, i.e., Arg(Free(T )) ⊆
⋂
Ei∈Extp(H) Ei , is trivial in the1661
case that Arg(Free(T )) is empty. Consider a ∈ Arg(Free(T )). Let E ∈ Extp(H).1662
Let us show that E ∪ {a} is conﬂict-free. Assume that ∃b = (d2, x2) ∈ E such that aRb1663
or bRa. From Lemma 1, there exists a′ ∈ Sub(a) such that a′ = (d ′1, x ′1) ∈ Arg((F,S,∅))1664
and a′Rb. Then, Seq(d ′1)∪ Seq(d2) is inconsistent. Since H satisﬁes strict precedence and1665
exhaustiveness, Arg((F,S,∅)) ⊆ E by Proposition 10, so a′ ∈ E . Consequently, Seq(d ′1)∪1666
Seq(d2) ⊆ CN(Th(E)) by Proposition 12. Since H satisﬁes consistency and closure under1667
sub-arguments, by Proposition 6 Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)) is consistent. Contradiction.1668
Let us show that E defends a. Consider b ∈ Arg(T ) such that bRa. From Lemma 1,1669
there exists a′ ∈ Sub(a) such that a′ ∈ Arg((F,S,∅)) and a′Rb. Since H satisﬁes strict1670
precedence and exhaustiveness, Arg((F,S,∅)) ⊆ E , thus a′ ∈ E .1671
Summing up, E ∪ {a} is an admissible set. However, E ∈ Extp(H) means that E is a1672
maximal admissible set; hence, E ∪ {a} ⊆ E . Therefore, a ∈ E . ⊓⊔1673
Proof of Theorem 26 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be a system built over a theory T such that1674
R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. From Theorem 22, for all E ∈1675
Extp(H), ∃O ∈ Max(POpt(T )) such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) ⊆ CN(O). From1676
Theorem 24, there cannot exist twomaximal preferred extensions E and E ′ such thatTh(E) ⊑1677
O and Th(E ′) ⊑ O for some O ∈ Max(POpt(T )). Thus, every maximal preferred option is1678
captured by at most one preferred extension. Then, |Extp(H)| ≤ |Max(POpt(T ))|. ⊓⊔1679
Proof of Theorem 27 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1680
T = (F,S,D). Assume that R ∈ ℜp2 . The following equalities hold by Theorems 161681
and 17: Extp(H) = Exts(H) = Extss(H) = {Arg(Oi ) | Oi ∈ Max(POpt(T ))}. Let us1682
now show the equality1683 ⋂
Oi∈Max(POpt(T ))
Arg(Oi ) = Arg(
⋂
Oi∈Max(POpt(T ))
Oi ).1684
Let Max(POpt(T )) = {O1 = (F,S,D1), . . . ,On = (F,S,Dn)}. Assume that (d, x) ∈1685
n⋂
i=1
Arg(Oi ). For any i = 1, . . . , n, (d, x) ∈ Arg(Oi ) and thus1686
(Facts(d),Strict(d),Def(d)) ⊑ Oi .1687
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This means that Def(d) ⊆
⋂n
i=1 Di . Consequently, d is also a derivation schema from1688
(F,S,
⋂n
i=1 Di ) =
⋂n
i=1 Oi . Finally, (d, x) ∈ Arg(
⋂n
i=1 Oi ).1689
Assume now that (d, x) ∈ Arg(
⋂n
i=1 Oi ). Then, d is a derivation schema from1690
(F,S,
⋂n
i=1 Di ). Hence, Def(d) ⊆
⋂n
i=1 Di . Hence, for any i = 1, . . . , n, Def(d) ⊆ Di .1691
Thus, d is a derivation schema from each theory Oi and (d, x) is an argument in each1692
Arg(Oi ).1693
From above, it follows that1694 ⋂
Oi∈Max(POpt(T ))
Arg(Oi ) = Arg(Free(T )).1695
⊓⊔1696
Proof of Theorem 28 Let H be an argumentation system which satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates.1697
From strict precedence and the fact that Output(H) = Concs(IE(H)), it holds that1698
CN((F,S,∅)) ⊆ Concs(IE(H)). From Theorem 4, Concs(IE(H)) = CN(O) such that1699
O = (F,S, Z) where1700
Z =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(d,x)∈IE(H)
Def(d)
⎞
⎠ ∪ {r | r ∈ D and Body(r)  CN(Th(IE(H)))} .1701
It holds thatTh(IE(H)) ⊑ O. From consistency postulate, it follows thatCN(O) is consistent1702
(since Concs(IE(H)) is consistent). Thus, there exists O′ ∈ POpt(T ) such that O ⊑ O′.1703
From Property 4, CN(O) ⊆ CN(O′). Consequently, Concs(IE(H)) ⊆ CN(O′). ⊓⊔1704
Proof of Theorem 29 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a1705
theory T . Assume that R ∈ ℜp2 and privileges strict arguments. From Theorem 27,1706 ⋂
Ei∈Extp(H) Ei = Arg(Free(T )). From Theorem 2, Arg(Free(T )) is an admissible1707
extension of H. Thus, IE(H) = Arg(Free(T )). ⊓⊔1708
Proof of Theorem 30 The proof is similar to that of Theorem 28. ⊓⊔1709
Proof of Corollary 1 It follows directly from Theorems 8 and 10. ⊓⊔1710
Proof of Corollary 2 It follows directly from Theorem 11 and Corollary 1. ⊓⊔1711
Proof of Corollary 3 It follows from Corollary 1. ⊓⊔1712
Proof of Corollary 4 It follows from Corollary 3, i.e., the equality |Extn(H)| = |Max(Opt1713
(T ))| and the fact that if a theory T is ﬁnite, then it has a ﬁnite number of options, thus of1714
maximal options. ⊓⊔1715
Proof of Corollary 5 LetH = (Arg(T ),R) be such thatR ∈ ℜs2 ∪ℜs3 . From Theorem 15,1716
Exts(H) = ∅. From Property 1, Exts(H) = Extss(H). ⊓⊔1717
Proof of Corollary 6 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1718
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. From Theorem 15,1719
Exts(H) = ∅. From Theorem 13, |Exts(H)| ≤ |Max(POpt(T ))|. ⊓⊔1720
Proof of Corollary 7 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system built over a theory1721
T such that R is conﬂict-dependent and H satisﬁes the ﬁve postulates. If T is ﬁnite, then T1722
has a ﬁnite number of maximal preferred options. From Corollary 6, H has a ﬁnite number1723
of stable extensions. ⊓⊔1724
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Proof of Corollary 8 It follows immediately from Theorem 26. ⊓⊔1725
Proof of Corollary 9 It follows immediately from Theorems 17, 13 and 16. ⊓⊔1726
Proof of Corollary 10 Let H = (Arg(T ),R) be an argumentation system over a the-1727
ory T such that R ∈ ℜp2 and privileges strict arguments. From Theorem 29, IE(H) =1728
Arg(Free(T )). Then,Output(H) = Concs(IE(H)) = Concs(Arg(Free(T ))). Since1729
CN(Free(T )) is consistent, CN(Free(T )) = Concs(Arg(Free(T ))). ⊓⊔1730
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